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Rethinking Grid Governance for the 
Climate Change Era 
Shelley Welton* 
The electricity sector is often appropriately called the linchpin of 
efforts to respond to climate change. Over the next few decades, the 
U.S. electricity sector will need to double in size to accommodate 
electric vehicles, while transforming to run entirely on clean energy. 
To drive this transformation, states are increasingly adopting 100 
percent clean energy targets. But fossil fuel corporations are pushing 
back, seeking to maintain their structural domination of the U.S. 
energy sector. This Article calls attention to one central but under-
scrutinized way that these companies impede the clean energy 
transition: incumbent fossil fuel companies essentially run the United 
States’ electricity grid, writing its rules in ways that favor their private 
interests at the expense of societal goals. 
In most of the country, entities known as Regional Transmission 
Organizations (RTOs) manage the electricity grid under Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) oversight. These 
organizations, formed in the late 1990s, have a distinct intellectual 
lineage in the privatization and new governance movements of that 
time. Most RTOs are structured as private industry clubs, in which 
industry members “vote” on the rules for regional electricity markets 
and grid operation. This governance arrangement has proven 
successful at maintaining a reliable grid but often serves as an 
impediment to progress on clean energy. Over the twenty years of their 
existence, many RTOs have resisted incorporating clean energy and 
energy conservation measures into their grids and market rules, 
despite strong evidence that treating these resources commensurately 
would lower costs and improve market functionality. Now, several 
regions are pursuing reforms in the name of “investor confidence” 
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and “fuel security” that privilege coal and natural gas resources—the 
same fossil fuels that many states are trying to phase out of their 
energy mix. 
This Article contends that the United States’ functionally 
privatized mode of electricity governance must be reevaluated as 
regulatory priorities shift in response to climate change. U.S. 
electricity law suffers from a gaping and growing accountability gap, 
in which neither FERC nor states have the authority needed to make 
electricity markets bend to democratically established prerogatives 
that harm industry incumbents. To remedy the situation, federal and 
state regulators need more robust authority to shape energy market 
rules to public aims. Drawing from informative differences across 
RTOs, the Article concludes with four reform pathways, suggesting 
that FERC or Congress might (1) pare back RTOs’ responsibilities, 
(2) enhance state and federal oversight capabilities, (3) police 
corporate agglomeration in the sector, and (4) explore public 
ownership or control over the grid. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The good news: over the last fifteen years, the United States’ greenhouse 
gas emissions have fallen roughly 12 percent.1 The bad: this decline is mostly 
due to the replacement of one particularly dirty fossil fuel—coal—with a slightly 
cleaner fossil fuel—natural gas.2 More recently, the coronavirus pandemic 
contributed to a further drop in emissions, but as one commentator succinctly put 
it, “I think it’s safe to say nobody wants to see greenhouse gasses reduced this 
way.”3 
The replacement of coal by natural gas should similarly receive little 
celebration, as this strategy is incapable of reducing emissions to the degree 
necessary to avoid catastrophic levels of climate change.4 What this strategy does 
produce, perversely, is more long-lived fossil fuel infrastructure whose value 
companies fight hard to preserve. Some of these self-preservation efforts have 
received substantial media and scholarly attention, including the decades-long, 
industry-funded climate change denial campaign.5 But others are more covert. 
This Article argues that one central but under-scrutinized way that fossil fuel 
companies maintain dominance is by essentially running the United States’ 
 
 1. See Trevor Houser & Hannah Pitt, Preliminary US Emissions Estimates for 2019, RHODIUM 
GRP. (Jan. 7, 2020), https://rhg.com/research/preliminary-us-emissions-2019 [https://perma.cc/7BTS-
BWRC]. 
 2. See id. Natural gas combustion has half the carbon emissions of coal and considerably fewer 
local air pollutant emissions. However, methane leaks during natural gas production offset a contested 
portion of its carbon benefits. See Ramón A. Alvarez et al., Assessment of Methane Emissions from the 
U.S. Oil and Gas Supply Chain, 361 SCI. 186, 186 (2018) (finding considerably higher methane 
emissions from natural gas than were reported by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency); Ellen 
Knickmeyer & Seth Borenstein, Americans’ Energy Use Surges Despite Climate Change Concern, AP 
NEWS (Apr. 18, 2019), 
https://www.apnews.com/7d4c9cc8f8c344fb9b800a5fd9c48866?hootPostID=a01ce7fe3ddb461beeac
b635b1aa0bf7 [https://perma.cc/JBA9-QLKC] (reflecting 10 percent increase in U.S. natural gas 
consumption in 2018). 
 3. Paul Huttner, Forecast: U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions to Fall 7.5-Percent in 2020, MPR 
NEWS (Apr. 8, 2020, 12:20 PM), https://www.mprnews.org/story/2020/04/08/us-greenhouse-gas-
emissions-may-fall-75percent-in-2020 [https://perma.cc/VMY3-RJJA]. 
 4. See infra Part III.A. 
 5. See NAOMI ORESKES & ERIK. M. CONWAY, MERCHANTS OF DOUBT: HOW A HANDFUL OF 
SCIENTISTS OBSCURED THE TRUTH ON ISSUES FROM TOBACCO SMOKE TO GLOBAL WARMING 169 
(2011). 
212 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  109:209 
electricity grid, writing its rules in ways that favor their private interests at the 
expense of public clean energy goals. 
Scholars, the media, and politicians have begun to turn a critical eye toward 
structural corporate domination in many U.S. economic sectors—most notably, 
banking and the Internet.6 They have paid less attention to the electricity 
industry, even though its byzantine regulatory structure is ripe for abuse by a 
small number of powerful incumbents. In most of the country,7 the electricity 
grid is managed by Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs), whose 
primary charge is to keep your lights on by managing the transmission grid and 
operating regional electricity markets.8 
These RTOs are, to be blunt, hardly anyone’s ideal governance structure. 
RTOs were born out of the deregulatory fever that swept through the U.S. 
economy beginning in the 1970s.9 Proponents of electricity deregulation 
believed that greater competition among electricity suppliers would drive down 
prices and spur innovation in the sector.10 However, full-throated deregulation is 
impossible in electricity, given the persistence of natural monopoly 
characteristics and the requirement of a perfect balance between supply and 
demand of electrons across the grid at all times.11 Consequently, as the Federal 
 
 6. See, e.g., GANESH SITARAMAN, TAKING ANTITRUST AWAY FROM THE COURTS: A 
STRUCTURAL APPROACH TO REVERSING THE SECOND AGE OF MONOPOLY POWER 3 (2018); ANDREW 
ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL (2009); TIM WU, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: ANTITRUST IN THE NEW 
GILDED AGE 16 (2018); Lina Khan & Sandeep Vaheesan, Market Power and Inequality: The Antitrust 
Counterrevolution and Its Discontents, 11 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 235, 236 (2017); Elizabeth Warren, 
Here’s How We Can Break up Big Tech, MEDIUM (Mar. 8, 2019), 
https://medium.com/@teamwarren/heres-how-we-can-break-up-big-tech-9ad9e0da324c 
[https://perma.cc/5LSV-PYCA]; SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET 
TAKEOVER AND THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 10, 13 (2010). 
 7. This Article does not discuss those regions of the country that have decided not to join 
RTOs—the Southeast and much of the West. A companion work-in-progress, The States that Opted 
Out, examines the status of electricity governance in those regions. 
 8. These grid managers are also called “Independent System Operators” (ISOs) in some 
regions. In this article, except where relevant for purposes of historical accuracy, I intend RTOs to 
include ISOs, as “[t]he difference between an ISO and RTO is largely semantic these days.” Devin 
Hartman, Wholesale Electricity Markets in the Technological Age, R ST. POL’Y STUDY NO. 67, Aug. 
2016, at 3 n.5. 
 9. See Michael H. Dworkin & Rachel Aslin Goldwasser, Ensuring Consideration of the Public 
Interest in the Governance and Accountability of Regional Transmission Organizations, 28 ENERGY 
L.J. 543, 545–46 (2007) (describing how FERC “has increasingly relied on market forces rather than 
cost-of-service regulation to provide the ‘just and reasonable’ rates” that the Federal Power Act 
requires); Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated Industries 
Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1327 (1998) (detailing this broader trend); David B. Spence, Can Law 
Manage Competitive Energy Markets?, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 765, 766 (2008) (describing conflicts 
embedded in energy-market deregulation). 
 10. Paul L. Joskow, Lessons Learned from Electricity Market Liberalization, 29 ENERGY J. 
(SPECIAL ISSUE) 9, 11 (2008) (suggesting that competitive wholesale markets should “provide better 
incentives for controlling construction and operating costs of new and existing generating capacity” and 
should “encourage innovation in power supply technologies,” among other benefits). 
 11. See FERC Order No. 2000, Regional Transmission Organizations, 65 Fed. Reg. 810, 811 
(issued Dec. 20, 1999) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35 (2019)) [hereinafter Order 2000] (endorsing 
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Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) worked to make electricity 
provisioning more competitive in the 1990s, it determined that intermediary 
organizations would be necessary to coordinate the emerging marketplace.12 In 
designing these organizations, FERC embraced the intellectual and pragmatic 
trends of the times, which favored privatization and “new governance”-style 
arrangements that emphasized collaboration between industry and regulators.13 
RTOs are institutions distinctly cut from this cloth. They are private membership 
clubs in which incumbent industry members make the rules for electricity 
markets and the electricity grid through private mini-democracies—with voting 
privileges reserved for RTO members—under broad regulatory authority.14 
When FERC created RTOs, the agency did not fully anticipate the vital role 
that these institutions would grow to play in controlling energy markets and U.S. 
energy infrastructure; nor did it anticipate the ways in which public objectives 
for the sector stood on the precipice of significant change.15 Thus, perhaps FERC 
can be forgiven for its initial faith in a “[l]ighter-[h]anded” regulatory structure.16 
Two decades later, however, this faith is demonstrably misplaced. 
In the last two years alone, ten states as well as Washington, D.C., and 
Puerto Rico have adopted 100 percent clean energy targets by legislation or 
executive order, thereby setting the United States on a plausible course toward 
real climate progress.17 With a new presidential administration now committed 
to rapid climate action, there is considerable hope that clean energy progress will 
accelerate. But achieving these goals requires the cooperation of RTOs, which 
must manage the integration of these resources into their grids and markets. 
 
competition but proposing intermediary organizations to manage “operational and reliability issues”); 
infra Part I. 
 12. See Order 2000, supra note 11, at 811; infra Part I. 
 13. See infra Part I.A (tracing RTOs’ intellectual genealogy). See also JON D. MICHAELS, 
CONSTITUTIONAL COUP: PRIVATIZATION’S THREAT TO THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 106 (2017) (tracing 
the intellectual lineage of a wide range of privatization techniques). I am sympathetic to William Boyd’s 
view that “[o]ne could, of course, consider the entire history of public utility regulation as an effort to 
create and sustain various types of hybrid institutions.” William Boyd, Public Utility and the Low-
Carbon Future, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1614, 1663 n.194 (2014). Viewed in that light, RTOs are one 
particularly neoliberal version of this hybridism that I believe to be singularly ill-advised. 
 14. This description is overgeneralized. See infra Part II.B–C and Shelley Welton, Appendix A 
(Feb. 2021), https://www.californialawreview.org/print/rethinking-grid-governance, for more on 
specific RTO structures. 
 15. See Kenneth Rose, Trouble in Market Paradise: Development of the Regional Transmission 
Operator, 50 J. ECON. ISSUES 535, 536 (2016) (explaining that RTOs have “developed and grown over 
time, taking on an increasing responsibility and importance”); see also infra Part III (on RTOs and the 
climate change challenge). 
 16. Order 2000, supra note 11, at 827. 
 17. Hawaii was the first state to pass such a law, in 2015. See UCLA LUSKIN CTR. FOR 
INNOVATION, PROGRESS TOWARD 100% CLEAN ENERGY IN CITIES & STATES ACROSS THE U.S. 2 
(2019); Julia Pyper, Tracking Progress on 100% Clean Energy Targets, GREENTECH MEDIA (Nov. 12, 
2019), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/tracking-progress-on-100-clean-energy-targets 
[https://perma.cc/GR9E-DJ6P] (reporting that “[s]even states, as well as Puerto Rico and the District of 
Columbia, have passed 100 percent clean energy transition laws,” and several others have executive 
orders to the same effect). 
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Certain RTOs have at times acted as partners, amending their rules to ensure that 
clean energy resources can participate in the grid.18 Increasingly, however, RTOs 
have used their control over market rules to erect problematic impediments to 
progress on clean energy. 
This Article argues that RTOs’ failures on this score can be traced to their 
functionally privatized governance systems, which are now making public policy 
decisions that they were never designed to address. RTOs have a myopic focus 
on grid reliability and growth in electricity supply that is at odds with public 
objectives for the sector. Consequently, many RTOs have actively resisted 
incorporating demand-side technologies, small-scale renewables, and energy 
storage into their grids and market rules, despite evidence that treating these 
resources commensurately would lower costs and improve market 
functionality.19 Now, several regions have adopted reforms in the name of 
“investor confidence” and “fuel security” that punish renewable resources while 
privileging the same fossil fuels that many states are trying to phase out of their 
energy mix.20 
This Article contends that U.S. grid governance must be redesigned to 
accommodate a new era of regulatory priorities that include responding to 
climate change.21 RTOs are able to adopt positions against new clean energy 
technologies because their hybrid, quasi-governmental institutional structures 
allow incumbent industry members to dominate stakeholder processes. 
Moreover, these same incumbents have dramatically concentrated their 
governance power through a trend of mergers over the last decade-plus, all while 
legislation and court precedent have narrowed FERC’s oversight tools and its 
ability to force change when the agency’s priorities diverge from those of 
RTOs.22 States, too, have struggled to retain their statutory authority over 
generation resources under increasingly marketized conditions.23 
 
 18. See Benjamin A. Stafford & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Winds of Change in Energy Systems: 
Policy Implementation, Technology Deployment, and Regional Transmission Organizations, 21 
ENERGY RSCH. & SOC. SCI. 222, 225–26 (2016) (describing the Midwest ISO’s successful integration 
of wind energy); Tom Kleckner, Another Wind Penetration Record for SPP, RTO INSIDER (Apr. 6, 
2018), https://rtoinsider.com/spp-wind-penetration-record-89917 [https://perma.cc/3AEG-6SRZ]; Tom 
Kleckner, Overheard at the Great Plains Institute SPP Workshop, RTO INSIDER (Dec. 18, 2017), 
https://rtoinsider.com/great-plains-institute-spp-82580 [https://perma.cc/T3A8-S3BP] (discussing wind 
integration in the Southwest Power Pool). 
 19. See infra Part III.B. 
 20. See infra Part III.C. 
 21. At last, some members of Congress appear to agree; in June 2019 congressional hearings, 
the House Energy and Commerce Committee’s Subcommittee on Energy urged FERC to holistically 
review RTO governance policies. Michael Brooks, FERC Probed on RTO Governance, Market Issues, 
RTO INSIDER (June 13, 2019), https://rtoinsider.com/ferc-probed-rto-governance-market-issues-
138272 [https://perma.cc/XN94-QZDL]. 
 22. See infra Part II.D. 
 23. The Federal Power Act explicitly gives states the right to choose how to source their 
electricity. See 16 U.S.C. § 824(a)–(b) (2018); Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288, 
1292 (2016). 
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The result is a growing accountability gap, in which neither FERC nor 
states have the authority needed to make electricity markets bend to 
democratically established prerogatives that harm industry incumbents. The 
problem is not regional grid governance per se. More robust regional 
collaboration—and perhaps ultimately a single national grid—is a prerequisite 
to integrating sufficient renewable energy into the U.S. energy system.24 For this 
reason, the Article’s preferred solution is to restructure regional grid governance, 
reclaiming it for public control rather than abandoning it.25 
In constructing its narrative of grid governance as untenably privatized, the 
Article stakes a claim contrary to those in energy law who see the RTO model 
as admirable or, at least, not an inherent obstacle to responding to climate 
change.26 Despite intense interest in energy federalism in recent years,27 there 
has largely been a reflexive scholarly acceptance of RTOs.28 This Article seeks 
to upend that acceptance. As the Article’s excavation of RTOs’ record on clean 
energy illustrates, these organizations should not be treated as benign partners 
ready to accept and effectuate the popular will on climate change.29 Instead, grid 
 
 24. See infra Part III.A. 
 25. See infra Part V. 
 26. This effort accords with work by William Boyd and David Spence questioning the ability 
of electricity markets as currently designed to accomplish climate change aims. See Boyd, supra note 
13, 1683–1708; David Spence, Naïve Energy Markets, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 973, 976 (2017). 
However, neither Boyd nor Spence diagnoses RTO governance as a critical flaw underpinning 
electricity market disfunction. 
 27. See, e.g., Joel B. Eisen, Dual Electricity Federalism Is Dead, but How Dead, and What 
Replaces It?, 8 GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY & ENV’T L. 3, 3 (2017); Daniel A. Lyons, Protecting States in 
the New World of Energy Federalism, 67 EMORY L.J. 921, 924 (2018); Jim Rossi, The Brave New Path 
of Energy Federalism, 95 TEX. L. REV. 399, 400 (2016); Ari Peskoe, Easing Jurisdictional Tensions by 
Integrating Public Policy in Wholesale Electricity Markets, 38 ENERGY L.J. 1, 1 (2017); Hannah J. 
Wiseman, Disaggregating Preemption in Energy Law, 40 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 293, 294 (2016). 
 28. After an early article questioning the RTO structure, see Dworkin & Goldwasser, supra note 
9, at 544, the field has largely gone silent on questions of grid governance. Several scholars have 
celebrated RTOs as intermediaries of federalist tensions in energy law, a characterization I agree with 
in its theoretical potential but contest in its current implementation. See, e.g., Hari M. Osofsky & Hannah 
J. Wiseman, Hybrid Energy Governance, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 53 (celebrating RTOs as a bridge 
between state and federal regulators); Lyons, supra note 27, at 972 (urging “greater reliance on regional 
cooperative-federalism structures such as RTOs”). Several legal scholars have also analyzed the 
problem of “market power” in electricity markets, by which certain firms game market rules to increase 
profits. These scholars appropriately raise questions about regulators’ abilities to police such abusive 
behaviors. But either explicitly or implicitly, these analyses accept the basic governance structures of 
RTOs. See Joseph T. Kelliher, Market Manipulation, Market Power, and the Authority of the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission, 26 ENERGY L.J. 1, 11 (2005); Alvin K. Klevorick, The Oversight of 
Restructured Electricity Markets, in ELECTRICITY DEREGULATION: CHOICES AND CHALLENGES 297, 
300 (James M. Griffin & Steven L. Puller eds., 2005); David B. Spence & Robert Prentice, The 
Transformation of American Energy Markets and the Problem of Market Power, 53 B.C. L. REV. 131, 
131 (2012); Sandeep Vaheesan, Market Power in Power Markets: The Filed-Rate Doctrine and 
Competition in Electricity, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 921, 928–32 (2013). 
 29. For this reason, absent governance reform, I am skeptical of ongoing efforts to give RTOs 
control over carbon pricing. See Shelley Welton, Electricity Markets and the Social Project of 
Decarbonization, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1067, 1080–82 (2018). 
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governance reform should itself be a priority of those who seek to advance 
decarbonization in the United States. 
To build its case, the Article draws from a growing body of scholarship, 
largely outside the legal literature, devoted to understanding how grid 
governance functions in various regions.30 These studies illuminate the 
mechanisms at work inside various RTOs, but they stop short of systematically 
connecting these mechanisms to many RTOs’ lackluster records on clean energy. 
Drawing from dozens of clean-energy-related filings at FERC, the Article forges 
these critical connections in order to diagnose the central flaw in RTO 
governance as an endemic bias against new resources that threaten incumbent 
profits. It argues that only enhanced public oversight and control can remedy this 
bias. Fortunately, poor governance structures have not equally compromised all 
RTOs. Some regional designs provide more political accountability than others, 
and the Article makes use of these differences in proposing reform 
recommendations. 
There are four paths to better grid governance, some of which could be 
pursued in combination.31 First, FERC could return RTOs to a leaner form 
focused on technical tasks suited for industry management. Second, FERC could 
accept that RTOs in their modern incarnation are policy-making bodies, and 
increase state and federal regulators’ oversight tools commensurately. Some of 
these reforms could be done by the agency; others would require congressional 
intervention. Third, to enhance the legitimacy of stakeholder governance, FERC 
or Congress could reduce agglomerated corporate power within the electricity 
sector. Finally, and most radically, if the new administration wanted to 
accomplish maximum progress on climate change, it could explore how to 
transition RTOs to public ownership or control. 
For those outside the field of energy law, the story of how industry 
incumbents have distorted grid governance may simply appear as a 
recapitulation of the dangers of privatization. But the tale told here is unique in 
an instructive way. All these challenges arose within one legal framework: public 
utility law. In fact, they largely arose within one statutory phrase: FERC’s 
obligation to ensure that rates in the electricity sector are “just,” “reasonable,” 
 
 30. See CHRISTINA SIMEONE, PJM GOVERNANCE: CAN REFORMS IMPROVE OUTCOMES? 22 
(2017); Stafford & Wilson, supra note 18, at 222; Kyungjin Yoo & Seth Blumsack, Can Capacity 
Markets Be Designed by Democracy?, 53 J. REGUL. ECON. 127, 127–28 (2018); Mark James, Kevin B. 
Jones, Ashleigh H. Krick & Rikaela R. Greane, How the RTO Stakeholder Process Affects Market 
Efficiency, R ST. POL’Y STUDY No. 112, Oct. 2017, at 1; Jennifer Chen & Gabrielle Murnan, State 
Participation in Resource Adequacy Decisions in Multistate Regional Transmission Organizations, 
DUKE U. NICHOLAS INST. FOR ENV’T POL’Y SOLUTIONS, Mar. 2019, at 1; E4THE FUTURE, INC., 
REGIONAL ENERGY MARKETS: DO INCONSISTENT GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES IMPEDE U.S. MARKET 
SUCCESS? 2 (2016). 
 31. See infra Part V. 
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and non-discriminatory.32 Managed competition via RTOs is FERC’s latest 
theory of how to accomplish this longstanding public utility mission.33 
Outside energy law, public utility law is experiencing a rebirth. In other 
fields suffering from concentrated corporate power, scholars are revisiting the 
public utility concept as a way to rebalance those sectors toward the public 
interest.34 The idea animating these proposals is that expanding the public utility 
concept to new domains could provide stronger public oversight and control of 
these sectors.35 I am, in general, sympathetic to the pursuit. But the framework 
of public utility law did not prevent RTO actions privileging fossil fuels over 
clean energy, because FERC and the courts have interpreted the public utility 
charge capaciously enough to allow for the privatized model of governance 
described herein. Public utility, then, has been undone from within in energy law 
by blind faith in market constructs, with insufficient attention to institutional 
theory and design. Understanding the transformation of public utility law within 
grid governance should aid efforts to apply the normative potential of public 
utility in other sectors.36 
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I excavates the origins of RTOs, 
situating them in their intellectual lineage. Part II traces RTOs’ development 
from birth to modern form and describes the concurrent doctrinal and legislative 
developments that changed the legal landscape of RTO governance. Part III 
draws from multiple examples of flawed or intransigent RTO decision-making 
on clean energy in order to illustrate that these governance structures are ill-
equipped to oversee the transformation of the grid demanded by climate change. 
Part IV then connects these challenges to RTO structure, arguing that the 
fundamental flaw in RTOs is one of overly privatized governance. Finally, Part 
V develops four categories of reforms that could align RTO governance with the 
public demands placed on the grid to help manage the accelerating climate crisis. 
I. 
CONTEXTUALIZING THE BIRTH OF RTOS 
The electricity industry consists of three basic parts: supply, transmission, 
and delivery of electrons. In most of the country, RTOs hold these parts together 
 
 32. See 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a)–(b) (2018). 
 33. See infra Part I. 
 34. See, e.g., K. SABEEL RAHMAN, DEMOCRACY AGAINST DOMINATION 131 (2017) 
(celebrating the legal robustness of the public utility concept); Jim Rossi & Morgan Ricks, Foreword to 
Revisiting the Public Utility, 35 YALE J. REGUL. 711 (2018) (special issue on “revisiting the public 
utility,” with contributions considering its application across economic sectors). 
 35. See K. Sabeel Rahman, Infrastructural Regulation and the New Utilities, 35 YALE J. REGUL. 
911, 914–15 (2018) (arguing that the “public utility tradition” offers important lessons for tackling the 
modern, cross-sectoral challenge of “unaccountable or arbitrary control over access to basic 
infrastructure”). 
 36. Cf. Boyd, supra note 13, at 1619 (arguing that “public utility” should be understood “first 
and foremost as a normative effort” or “undertaking” aimed at protecting the public’s interest in key 
infrastructure sectors). 
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by running a series of markets and dispatch algorithms that decide which 
electrons should be sent where, and when, to maximize the grid’s reliability and 
minimize costs. However, these grid managers are relatively new organizations. 
This Part tells the story of why FERC created these strange institutional 
creatures, connecting their origin story to the broader intellectual movements 
toward deregulation and privatization. 
From the advent of electricity until the 1990s, the industry was dominated 
by vertically integrated, often investor-owned corporations that controlled all 
three components of the system within their monopoly service territory. In 
exchange for this privilege, the law regulated these corporations as public 
utilities, subjecting their rates to close regulatory scrutiny.37 At first, this was 
done on a state-by-state basis. Then, beginning in 1935 with passage of the 
Federal Power Act, Congress gave FERC control over interstate wholesale sales 
between utilities and interstate transmission, while explicitly leaving the states 
with control over generation resources and retail sales to end-use consumers.38 
This arrangement endured for many decades, with minor modifications to 
adapt to changing times. As utilities began to trade more power among 
themselves, several received permission from FERC to form “power pools,” 
which jointly coordinated electricity dispatch to enhance system efficiencies.39 
By the 1990s, several of these pools had petitioned FERC to form Independent 
System Operators (ISOs) to act as more centralized dispatch agents, charged with 
managing all the transmission lines within a region.40 These ISOs became the 
blueprint for FERC’s later push to form larger, multi-state RTOs across the 
country.41 
In the 1990s, the drive for competition began in earnest in the electricity 
industry.42 Some states split ownership of generation from ownership of 
transmission and distribution as a way to increase industry competition. 
Similarly, states experimented with “retail choice” programs, in which 
consumers could shop around for an electricity provider rather than be tethered 
to their designated monopoly utility.43 As more power began to flow among 
utilities, FERC ordered these entities to file open access tariffs with the 
Commission—a move intended to promote a more integrated power grid by 
ensuring that utilities did not overcharge their competitors for use of their 
 
 37. See Morgan Stanley Cap. Grp. Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 554 U.S. 527, 535–36 (2008); 
Spence, supra note 9, at 769. 
 38. 16 U.S.C. § 824 (2018); New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 20–21 (2002) (discussing history 
of Federal Power Act). 
 39. Dworkin & Goldwasser, supra note 9, at 554 (describing the history of power pools). 
 40. See Order 2000, supra note 11, at 815 (noting that ISOs had been approved or conditionally 
approved for California, Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland or PJM (the mid-Atlantic), New York, 
New England, and the Midwest, and that Texas had established its own ISO). 
 41. See infra notes 92–93. 
 42. See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 9, at 1367–68. 
 43. See MATHEW J. MOREY & LAURENCE D. KIRSCH, RETAIL CHOICE IN ELECTRICITY: WHAT 
HAVE WE LEARNED IN 20 YEARS? 3–5 (2016). 
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transmission lines.44 FERC also suggested that regions explore more tightly 
coordinated forms of transmission management as a way to prevent this 
discrimination.45 
However, open access filings proved too anemic a solution, as they did not 
eliminate utilities’ ability to surreptitiously favor their own resources or grant 
preferences to a limited number of collaborators.46 In 1999, FERC tried to create 
a more fulsome solution by pushing for all regions to form RTOs to control 
transmission.47 Notably, as with the agency’s acceptance of power pools and 
independent system operators, FERC created RTOs without any new statutory 
authority. Instead, the Commission used its broad and longstanding Federal 
Power Act authority to ensure “just and reasonable rates.”48 To connect this 
authority to its proposal, FERC explained that independent regional control of 
the grid would “reduce opportunities for unduly discriminatory conduct,” enable 
more efficient system dispatches, and enhance transmission planning.49 Based 
on a number of modeled scenarios, the Commission estimated that RTO 
formation might save $2.4 billion per year.50 
In this way, FERC told a story of RTOs as the obvious answer to unfolding 
events.51 But even if some novel governing arrangement may have been 
 
 44. FERC Order No. 888, Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-
Discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public 
Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540 (issued Apr. 24, 1996) (codified at 18 C.F.R. 
pts. 35, 385 (2019)) [hereinafter Order 888]. 
 45. See id. at 21,594; see also Richard P. O’Neill et al., The Governance of Energy Displacement 
Network Oligopolies, Office of Economic Policy 23 (Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n, Discussion Paper 
No. 96-08, 1996), https://www.ferc.gov/legal/maj-ord-reg/land-docs/oligoply.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/E5UQ-E3GE] (describing ISOs as “a step beyond functional unbundling”). 
 46. Order 2000, supra note 11, at 824 (explaining that functional unbundling of assets was not 
enough because it was “difficult for transmission providers to implement and difficult for the market 
and the Commission to monitor and police”). 
 47. Id. at 811, 813, 824 (“[V]ertically integrated utilities have the incentive and the opportunity 
to favor their generation interests over those of their competitors.”). For more on changes leading to the 
formation of RTOs, see generally RICHARD F. HIRSH, POWER LOSS: THE ORIGINS OF DEREGULATION 
AND RESTRUCTURING IN THE AMERICAN ELECTRIC UTILITY SYSTEM (1999) (discussing the erosion of 
the “utility consensus” that prevailed through the bulk of the twentieth century); Joskow, supra note 10 
(situating U.S. deregulatory movement within international context); Spence, supra note 9, at 767–79. 
 48. See 16 U.S.C. § 824d–e (2018); Order 2000, supra note 11, at 837; see also Jody Freeman 
& David B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 43–58 (2014) (describing how 
FERC used longstanding Federal Power Act authority to manage deregulation). Congress provided 
FERC some additional statutory authority for restructuring in the Energy Policy Act of 1992, but the 
agency largely proceeded on its own initiative. See Freeman & Spence, supra; see also Energy Policy 
Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, § 711, 106 Stat. 2776 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C., 16 
U.S.C., 42 U.S.C.). 
 49. Order 2000, supra note 11, at 829. 
 50. Id. at 830. Whether RTOs have in fact produced all these gains remains a matter of scholarly 
debate. See Seth Blumsack, Measuring the Benefits and Costs of Regional Electric Grid Integration, 28 
ENERGY L.J. 147, 148 (2007) (“Broadly speaking, analyses by RTOs and industry consultants trumpet 
benefits to consumers in the billions of dollars, while academics have generally come to the opposite 
conclusion.”). 
 51. See Order 2000, supra note 11, 828–29. 
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necessary to facilitate deregulation within the electricity sector, the peculiar form 
that regional grid governance has taken was not inevitable.52 To the contrary, this 
form was one manifestation of the privatization movement that swept the U.S. 
administrative state around this time.53 Understanding RTOs as a part of this shift 
in bureaucratic theory and practice helps to contextualize the challenges of RTOs 
as interrelated with broader critiques of the privatization movement. 
By the time FERC formed RTOs, there was strong bipartisan agreement 
that government should deregulate where it could and run more like a business 
where it could not.54 Academics from libertarians to progressives championed 
ideas of “new governance” that would “dislocate traditional state-produced 
regulation from its privileged place” and replace it “with a more participatory 
and collaborative model, in which government, industry, and society share 
responsibility for achieving policy goals.”55 Strategies to accomplish this 
collaboration included transferring responsibilities to “private businesses and 
nonprofit organizations” that could engage in “audited self-regulation.”56 These 
theories of reinventing government57 resulted in a host of new quasi-
governmental, hybrid, or boundary organizations operating at the border 
between government and the private sector.58 
 
 52. See, e.g., infra Part IV (describing alterations and alternatives to the current governance 
regime). 
 53. I use “privatization” broadly, as others have, to indicate the use of private actors to carry out 
state responsibilities. See MICHAELS, supra note 13, at 106. 
 54. See KEVIN R. KOSAR, THE QUASI GOVERNMENT: HYBRID ORGANIZATIONS WITH BOTH 
GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE SECTOR LEGAL CHARACTERISTICS 31 (2011) (describing the intellectual 
lineage of “New Public Management”); MICHAELS, supra note 13, at 79–118 (tracing the decades of 
thinking and practice that led to this bi-partisan consensus). See also Jody Freeman, Collaborative 
Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 3 (1997) (describing regulation as being 
widely “under attack . . . as inefficient, ineffective, and undemocratic”). U.S. theories along these lines 
owe much to earlier British experiments. See MICHAELS, supra note 13, at 9596 (describing Thatcher’s 
privatization program); MARY M. TIMNEY, POWER FOR THE PEOPLE: PROTECTING STATES’ ENERGY 
POLICY INTERESTS IN AN ERA OF DEREGULATION 99–100 (2004) (describing this lineage). 
 55. Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in 
Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 344, 345–46, 350 (2004) (describing the contours 
of the “new governance” movement and its bipartisan support). See also Charles F. Sabel & William H. 
Simon, Minimalism and Experimentalism in the Administrative State, 100 GEO. L.J. 53, 53–61 (2011) 
(outlining the movement towards “minimalism” and “experimentalism”); Paul R. Verkuil, Public Law 
Limitations on Privatization of Government Functions, 84 N.C. L. REV. 397, 418 (2006) (describing 
“[t]he new lexicon of government management” including “‘privatization,’ ‘public and private 
partnerships,’ ‘deregulation,’ ‘downsizing,’ and ‘self-regulation’”). 
 56. Lobel, supra note 55, at 345; see Verkuil, supra note 55, at 399 (underlining the rapid growth 
in the “number of private contractors doing the work of government”). 
 57. See generally DAVID OSBORNE & TED GAEBLER, REINVENTING GOVERNMENT: HOW THE 
ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT IS TRANSFORMING THE PUBLIC SECTOR (1992). 
 58. See JONATHAN G.S. KOPPELL, THE POLITICS OF QUASI-GOVERNMENT: HYBRID 
ORGANIZATIONS AND THE DYNAMICS OF BUREAUCRATIC CONTROL 1–8 (2006); KOSAR, supra note 
54, at ii (“These hybrid organizations . . . have grown in number, size, and importance in recent 
decades.”); David H. Guston, Boundary Organizations in Environmental Policy and Science: An 
Introduction, 26 SCI. TECH. & HUM. VALUES 399, 400–02 (2001); Anne Joseph O’Connell, 
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In the case of electricity, scholars and regulators agreed that complete 
deregulation was impossible. The transmission grid retains natural monopoly 
characteristics because it is inefficient for multiple companies to duplicate 
transmission lines in a single locale.59 Moreover, the grid must maintain a perfect 
balance between supply and demand of electrons at all times.60 Therefore, some 
regulatory entity had to oversee the modern grid—and one can see fingerprints 
of these privatization theories throughout FERC’s design of RTOs.61 
FERC’s particular brand of privatization took the following form: the 
agency issued an order asking utilities to join RTOs, accompanied by a stern, 
parental-style plea: “[W]e expect jurisdictional utilities to form RTOs. If the 
industry fails to form RTOs under this approach, the Commission will reconsider 
what further regulatory steps are in the public interest.”62 To entice utilities to 
join, FERC left the design details up to the industry. The Commission merely 
offered a list of required “characteristics” and “functions” that RTOs must have. 
Most centrally, it required that RTOs be (1) independent, (2) regional, and (3) 
responsible for the operation of the grid.63 To meet these characteristics, FERC 
specified that RTOs must be given authority to design and administer their own 
regional tariffs, which would establish rules for regional transmission 
management.64 
Understanding this tariff authority is critical to understanding the power 
dynamics between FERC and RTOs. FERC oversees these tariffs as utility rate 
filings under Federal Power Act section 205, which requires the agency to play 
a “passive and reactive role” by approving any RTO filing that it determines will 
result in “just and reasonable” rates.65 In contrast, for FERC or any other entity 
 
Bureaucracy at the Boundary, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 841, 842 (2014); Harold Seidman, The Quasi World 
of the Federal Government, BROOKINGS REV., Summer 1988, at 23. 
 59. See Paul L. Joskow, Incentive Regulation in Theory and in Practice: Electricity Distribution 
and Transmission Networks, in ECONOMIC REGULATION AND ITS REFORM: WHAT HAVE WE 
LEARNED? 291 (Nancy L. Rose ed., 2014). 
 60. Nevertheless, FERC explicitly credits deregulatory theories as the driving force behind 
reforms precipitating the creation of RTOs. See Order 2000, supra note 11, at 813–15 (discussing 
restructuring as impetus); ELEC. ENERGY MKT. COMPETITION TASK FORCE, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON 
COMPETITION IN WHOLESALE AND RETAIL MARKETS FOR ELECTRIC ENERGY 2 (2007); Boyd, supra 
note 13, at 1661–64. 
 61. Many prominent energy policy scholars also advocated for this format. See, e.g., WILLIAM 
W. HOGAN, CARRIE CULLEN HITT & JANELLE SCHMIDT, HARV. ELEC. POL’Y GRP., GOVERNANCE 
STRUCTURES FOR AN INDEPENDENT SYSTEM OPERATOR (ISO) 2 (1996) (noting “significant 
advantages” to the ISO approach to electricity management); Paul L. Joskow, Restructuring, 
Competition and Regulatory Reform in the U.S. Electricity Sector, 11 J. ECON. PERSPS. 119, 121 (1997). 
 62. Order 2000, supra note 11, at 811. 
 63. Id. at 842. FERC clarified that, by “independent,” it meant independent from “market 
participants.” Id. 
 64. Id. at 858. 
 65. See Morgan Stanley Capital Grp. Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 554 U.S. 527, 530 (2008); 
NRG Power Mktg. v. FERC, 862 F.3d 108, 114 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (observing that “Section 205 puts 
FERC in a passive and reactive role”) (internal quotations omitted). See also Dworkin & Goldwasser, 
supra note 9, at 577 (noting the contentiousness of RTO section 205 filing rights); James et al., supra 
note 30, at 3 (labeling the “different burdens of proof between Section 205 and 206” as “critical”). 
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to force a change in an RTO’s (or a utility’s) rates, FERC must act under section 
206, whether on its own motion or in response to a complaint. The higher burden 
of proof in section 206 requires FERC to demonstrate that the current rates are 
“entirely outside the zone of reasonableness.”66 Thus, having section 205 filing 
authority gives RTOs particular influence over regional rules.67 
When encouraging RTOs, FERC declined to mandate any particular 
regional boundaries, ownership structure, or organizational form. Thus, FERC 
allowed for both for-profit and not-for-profit RTOs and left open the rules 
regarding independent board composition.68 FERC also demurred as to the role 
that states should play within RTO governance, allowing regional negotiations 
to establish the role of these government regulators.69 
Essentially, then, FERC contracted out the oversight of regional grid 
management to private, industry-led, voluntary clubs. In the words of several 
FERC contemporaries, these clubs were “quintessentially American” in their 
“democratic” approach to industry regulation, relying “on checks and balances 
among all industry segments to help prevent unfair advantages.”70 To be sure, 
this was not classic contracting-out, where the government signed away its pre-
existing duties to a private contractor.71 It was a more nuanced form of 
outsourcing, where a new, private intermediary was created to interface between 
traditional public utilities and their federal regulator. You could call it, in the 
words of Jon Michaels, “millennial privatization”72 or treat it as a product of 
“new governance” theory.73 You could call RTOs hybrid or quasi-governmental 
organizations,74 self-regulatory organizations,75 or more provocatively, “legal 
 
 66. NRG Power Mktg., 862 F.3d at 114 n.2 (quoting City of Winnfield v. FERC, 744 F.2d 871, 
875 (D.C. Cir. 1984)); see also Chen & Murnan, supra note 30, at 7–8. 
 67. See Dworkin & Goldwasser, supra note 9, at 577. 
 68. See Order 2000, supra note 11, at 847–48, 857. 
 69. See id. at 848–49, 858, 910. 
 70. O’Neill et al., supra note 45, at 23. 
 71. On the prevalence of contracting out during this time, see GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: 
OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (Jody Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009); Martha 
Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New Religion, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1229, 
1233 (2003). 
 72. See MICHAELS, supra note 13, at 18, 105–10 (using this term to cover the more diffuse, 
unusual styles of privatization that emerged during the 1990s). 
 73. See, e.g., Lester M. Salamon, The New Governance and the Tools of Public Action: An 
Introduction, in THE TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT: A GUIDE TO THE NEW GOVERNANCE 1, 14, 15 (Lester 
M. Salamon ed., 2002) (describing arrangements that “defy” traditional precepts of the public/private 
divide as “new governance,” a theory rooted in collaboration between the public and private spheres). 
 74. See SIMEONE, supra note 30, at 22 (“[L]ike utilities, RTO’s operate transmission grids, but 
like regulators, RTO’s oversee markets, impose penalties, and are tasked with balancing stakeholder 
concerns.”); Stafford & Wilson, supra note 18, at 234 (describing RTOs as boundary organizations and 
policy-making bodies); see also Ronald C. Moe, The Emerging Federal Quasi Government: Issues of 
Management and Accountability, 61 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 290, 291 (2001) (“The truth is that the quasi 
government, virtually by its name alone and the intentional blurring of its boundaries, is not definable 
in any precise way.”). 
 75. See infra notes 82–86 and accompanying text. 
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cartels.”76 The nomenclature is much debated but not that central for my 
purposes. 
It is not clear whether FERC could have chosen a structure other than the 
private-club RTO model, given how popular these new forms of collaborative, 
industry-driven governance had become among both political parties.77 
Moreover, there was the dubious matter of legal authority: several states and 
utilities suggested FERC would overreach its jurisdiction were it to make RTO 
membership mandatory.78 FERC equivocated on this point, reserving judgment 
on whether it could mandate the establishment of RTOs.79 Ultimately, 
congressional opposition killed the idea, rendering the jurisdictional question 
moot for the time being.80 
FERC also explicitly celebrated the creation of voluntary RTOs on new 
governance grounds, explaining that RTOs would “facilitate lighter handed 
regulation.”81 On this score, FERC’s optimism had some support in institutional 
theory. Perhaps the closest institutional analog to RTOs is the world of “self-
regulatory organizations” (SROs), which is best theorized within securities 
law.82 In analyzing the propriety of financial SROs, legal scholars have found 
that these organizations work best when: market participants have incentives to 
self-police;83 the interests of regulators and market participants align;84 technical 
expertise within the industry is critical to effective rulemaking;85 and potential 
victims of wrongdoing are within the industry and are not weak or vulnerable.86 
 
 76. Martin O’Malley, Ex-Maryland Gov O’Malley: States Must Reassert Authority on Clean 
Energy Policy, UTIL. DIVE (Mar. 28, 2019), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/ex-maryland-gov-
omalley-states-must-reassert-authority-on-clean-energy-po/551461 [https://perma.cc/YUG8-
4WLF]. 
 77. See MICHAELS, supra note 13, at 104–05. 
 78. See Order 2000, supra note 11, at 831–33, 838–40. 
 79. See id. at 840 n.162 (“We need not decide in this case the extent of the Commission’s 
authority to mandate generically RTO participation.”). 
 80. See Clinton A. Vince et al., What Is Happening and Where in the World of RTOs and ISOs?, 
27 ENERGY L.J. 65, 75–76 (2006). 
 81. Order 2000, supra note 11, at 811, 830. 
 82. As Saule Omarova describes, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) and the 
registered stock exchanges “operate under strict oversight by the Securities Exchange Commission 
(SEC) and direct their activities primarily at managing, often in excruciating detail, the everyday 
business of securities broker-dealers and other market intermediaries”—making them relatively similar 
in institutional positioning to RTOs. Saule T. Omarova, Wall Street as Community of Fate: Toward 
Financial Industry Self-Regulation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 411, 417 (2011); see William A. Birdthistle & 
M. Todd Henderson, Becoming a Fifth Branch, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2013); James J. Park, Rules, 
Principles, and the Competition to Enforce the Securities Laws, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 115 (2012); Cary 
Coglianese, Elizabeth K. Keating, Michael L. Michael & Thomas J. Healey, The Role of Government 
in Corporate Governance, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 219 (2004). 
 83. See Birdthistle & Henderson, supra note 82, at 8; Park, supra note 82, at 144; Omarova, 
supra note 82, at 416. 
 84. See Birdthistle & Henderson, supra note 82, at 26. 
 85. Id. at 56; Omarova, supra note 82, at 433; Coglianese et al., supra note 82, at 224. 
 86. Birdthistle & Henderson, supra note 82, at 26. 
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At RTOs’ inception, the electricity industry arguably had many of these 
characteristics. RTOs’ primary charge—establishing rules for the efficient use 
of the interconnected transmission grid—would benefit all industry participants 
and consumers, as almost everyone bought or sold some outside power by this 
point.87 FERC likely also perceived any potential victims of discriminatory RTO 
practices as limited to sophisticated industry players, given that RTOs would 
regulate wholesale transactions between independent generators and utilities. 
Perhaps most critically, FERC perceived the initial scope of RTO 
governance as limited, designed to tap into the industry’s particular expertise 
without threatening to usurp the regulator’s role.88 Because RTOs grew out of 
power pools and independent system operators, industry control of this more 
robust form of regional collaboration likely seemed unthreatening.89 RTOs were 
merely an expansion of these pre-existing, technocratic bodies. In accordance 
with this vision, one former FERC staffer explained that FERC thought that RTO 
stakeholder governance processes would be limited to fights about “whether bids 
for electricity for the next day should be due at 2 p.m. or 4 p.m.”90 
As the next section will describe, things have turned out quite differently. 
In part through FERC initiatives, and in part through RTO-led mission 
expansion, RTOs have come to have a consequential role in dictating the terms 
of U.S. energy infrastructure investment, with ramifications that reach far 
beyond internal industry players.91 At the same time, the rise of climate change 
as a policy priority has created increasing divergence between the priorities of 
industry incumbents and their state and federal regulators—thus changing 
substantially the calculus of self-regulation. 
II. 
RTOS’ ADOLESCENCE: A MESSY PERIOD OF GROWTH 
The previous Section focused on RTOs’ creation. This Section describes 
how this grid governance experiment has evolved during two decades of 
implementation, focusing on two key developments: (1) RTO stakeholder 
governance arrangements and (2) growth in RTO responsibilities. The Section 
then explains how the courts and Congress have complicated FERC’s efforts to 
 
 87. See Order 888, supra note 44, at 21,594 (noting the “industry’s interest (which we share) in 
the . . . potential for an ISO to provide non-discriminatory transmission services . . . .”). 
 88. See Dworkin & Goldwasser, supra note 9, at 555 (suggesting that FERC valued RTOs’ “on-
the-ground knowledge”). 
 89. See Boyd, supra note 13, at 1663 (outlining history behind RTOs); Dworkin & Goldwasser, 
supra note 9, at 554 (noting that several RTO functions were previously performed “on a multi-company 
basis through power pools, including those which, like the New England Power Pool (NEPOOL), were 
described as ‘tight’ power pools because they had significant control over dispatch and transmission 
scheduling on an operational basis”). 
 90. Telephone Interview with Former FERC Staffer (Mar. 28, 2019) (notes on file with author, 
anonymity granted due to continued role in industry). 
 91. See infra Part II.C. 
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manage RTOs, through precedent and legislative changes that impoverish both 
regulatory accountability and intra-industry competition. 
A. The Spectrum of Regional Responses 
FERC’s efforts to create a uniform model of grid governance were 
unsuccessful. Order 2000’s parental-style plea to form RTOs allowed utilities 
either to file a proposal for an RTO or else “a description of efforts to participate 
in an RTO.”92 Some regions—particularly those that already had an ISO—
quickly acquiesced to RTO formation.93 In contrast, utilities in the South and the 
West (aside from California), two regions with historically low power prices, 
resisted regionalization.94 In light of these mixed results, in 2002, FERC issued 
notice of plans to exercise a heavier parental hand by forcing all regions to adopt 
a Standard Market Design.95 But again, utilities in non-RTO regions balked, and 
states resisted FERC’s perceived jurisdictional power grab.96 And so FERC 
backpedaled. In 2005, it officially terminated its proposed rule, declining to 
enforce a single model across the United States electricity sector.97 
Accordingly, the United States is left with a hodge-podge system: official 
RTOs in four regions; smaller ISOs that function equivalently to RTOs in two 
regions; and no central regional grid coordinator in the remainder of the country 
(see Figure 1).98 Today, two-thirds of the country (measured by population) is 
under an RTO/ISO, but not all of the scale FERC desired.99 
 
 92. Order 2000, supra note 11, at 812. 
 93. FERC approved some of these pre-existing ISOs as RTOs; others it rejected as being not 
regional enough in scope (for this reason, New York’s and California’s ISOs have never been officially 
designated as RTOs). See N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 96 FERC ¶ 61,059, 61,184 (July 12, 2001); 
ISO New England, Inc., 106 FERC ¶ 61,280, 62,023 n.8 (Mar. 24, 2004); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 106 
FERC ¶ 61,242, 61,855 (Mar. 9, 2004). 
 94. See Order 2000, supra note 11, at 935–36. 
 95. Remedying Undue Discrimination Through Open Access Transmission Service and 
Standard Electricity Market Design, 67 Fed. Reg. 55,452, 55,455, 55,458 (July 31, 2002) (codified at 
18 C.F.R. pt. 35 (2019)) (describing RTO formation process as too slow and uncertain); id. at 55,564 
(describing required markets). 
 96. See CONG. RSCH. SERV., FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION’S STANDARD 
MARKET DESIGN ACTIVITIES 3 (2003) (noting widespread state opposition). 
 97. See Order Terminating Proceeding, 70 Fed. Reg. 43,140–02, 43,140–41 (July 26, 2005). 
 98. See generally William Boyd & Ann E. Carlson, Accidents of Federalism: Ratemaking and 
Policy Innovation in Public Utility Law, 63 UCLA L. REV. 810 (2016) (describing the three different 
models of state electricity regulation). Texas also has an RTO, but its grid is not connected interstate and 
thus is not under federal jurisdiction. See id. at 855. 
 99. E4THE FUTURE, supra note 30, at 3. 
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Figure 1. RTOs and ISOs by Region100 
B. The Modern RTO: Stakeholder Governance 
As RTOs took shape in the early 2000s, critics worried that their early 
governance design was too responsive to the concerns of volunteer member 
utilities and insufficiently protective of the public interest.101 To respond to these 
concerns, FERC focused on shoring up the internal stakeholder process used to 
inform RTO decision-making. In 2008, FERC ordered each RTO to demonstrate 
that its stakeholder processes met specified “responsiveness” criteria, intended 
to “establish a means for customers and other stakeholders to have a form of 
direct access to the board of directors, and thereby to increase the boards of 
directors’ responsiveness to these entities.”102 But here again, FERC deferred to 
RTOs to shape their own processes. The result of this deference has been a 
profusion of dense, convoluted RTO stakeholder governance processes, each 
with its own quirks (for details, see Appendix A).103 To provide a flavor of RTO 
governance today, I offer below sketches of the internal governance 
machinations of the two most divergent RTOs: PJM and California. 
 
 100. RTOs and ISOs, FED. ENERGY REGUL. COMM’N, https://www.ferc.gov/industries-
data/electric/power-sales-and-markets/rtos-and-isos [https://perma.cc/9497-EP3B]. 
 101. See FERC Order No. 719, Wholesale Competition in Regions with Organized Electricity 
Markets, 73 Fed. Reg. 64,100 (Oct. 28, 2008) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35 (2019)) [hereinafter Order 
719]; Dworkin & Goldwasser, supra note 9, at 543, 547–48; Klevorick, supra note 28, at 309. 
 102. Order 719, supra note 101, at 64,154. 
 103. See Welton, Appendix A, supra note 14. 
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1. Big and Bold: PJM’s Membership-Driven RTO Governance 
PJM (originally named for Pennsylvania-Jersey-Maryland, but now 
encompassing portions of thirteen states and Washington, D.C.) is the biggest 
and perhaps the boldest of RTO governance experiments. However, the broad 
outlines of its governance practices are representative of most RTOs other than 
California.104 PJM is technically a limited liability company but has no assets of 
its own, so it functions like a not-for-profit.105 The company is governed by a 
nine-member, independent board of directors106 elected by the Members 
Committee, which is the senior governing committee of PJM.107 Each member 
of PJM gets one vote at the Members Committee, where decisions are taken by 
weighted sectoral voting to ensure that no market sector dominates the others 
through sheer number of participants.108 To become a voting member, one must 
apply and demonstrate an ownership interest in one PJM sector: transmission 
owner, generation owner, other supplier, electric distributor, or end-use 
customer.109 The key entities charged with protecting consumer interests—state-
level consumer advocates—are simply lumped in with end-use customers for 
purposes of voting, giving them limited power within these proceedings.110 Other 
stakeholders can still participate in RTO meetings, but hold no voting sway.111 
In a move that sets PJM apart from other RTOs, it has split its section 205 
filing rights—recall, those are the rights to petition FERC for any “just and 
reasonable” change to operating rules—between the Members Committee and 
the PJM Board, each of which controls changes to certain markets and other 
topics within the region.112 Issues reach the consideration of the Members 
Committee through internal lower committees.113 For most issues, the Members 
Committee requires a two-thirds weighted vote to pass an issue on either to the 
 
 104. See E4THEFUTURE, supra note 30, at 3, 6. 
 105. See Dworkin & Goldwasser, supra note 9, at 552 n.43 (explaining that PJM operates at a 
“zero profit margin”) (internal quotations omitted). All other RTOs are non-profit. Id. at 552. 
 106. Independence here is defined by FERC as lacking financial or personal interest in market 
participants. See Order 2000, supra note 11, at 842. 
 107. SIMEONE, supra note 30, at 9. 
 108. In PJM, each sector gets an equal weight in voting—that is, 20 percent, since there are five 
sectors. See id. at 10. 
 109. E4THE FUTURE, supra note 30, at 6; SIMEONE, supra note 30, at 10. 
 110. See Doing Business with PJM FAQs, PJM, https://learn.pjm.com/pjm-
structure/governance/doing-business-with-pjm-faqs/what-are-the-categories-of-pjm-membership.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/Y6KR-RNZ3]. 
 111. See James et al., supra note 30, at 2. 
 112. PJM’s Board holds filing rights over the region’s capacity market, among other issues, 
whereas the Members Committee controls the operating agreement, which governs energy and ancillary 
service markets. See Order of Proposed Tariff Revisions, PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 151 FERC ¶ 
61,208, 62,297 n.3 (June 9, 2015). 
 113. SIMEONE, supra note 30, at 9–10. “User groups” provide an additional means of bringing 
an issue before the Members Committee. See Welton, Appendix A, supra note 14. 
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PJM Board or to FERC.114 Of course, any member or other stakeholder is free to 
propose changes under section 206 of the Federal Power Act, but the member 
then has the burden of demonstrating to FERC that the existing rules are “unjust 
and unreasonable.”115 
Two other features of PJM governance deserve mention because of their 
advisory powers: the role of the market monitor and the role of the states. FERC 
requires RTOs to engage independent market monitors to ensure that no firm 
exercises market power to manipulate market rules for private gain.116 In PJM, 
an independent firm named Monitoring Analytics provides this service and 
makes annual reports and recommendations on the state of PJM’s market 
performance.117 However, PJM does not have to adopt the recommendations 
made by its market monitor, and researchers suggest that less than half of 
Monitoring Analytics’ recommendations made to PJM between 1999 and 2015 
were ever adopted.118 
PJM—like all multi-state RTOs—also has a regional state committee, 
which is known as the Organization of PJM States, Inc., or OPSI.119 A public 
utility commission representative from each state within PJM’s footprint (as well 
as D.C.—no taxation without representation here) serves as part of OPSI. But 
OPSI’s role is limited to influence: OPSI “liaises with PJM and monitors 
proposals impacting state interests,” but has no formal role in PJM decision-
making structures.120 
PJM’s modern governance structure thus consists of a complex 
arrangement of shared power between an independent board and RTO members, 
who jointly hold power over a plethora of grid management decisions. Most RTO 
governance processes operate similarly to PJM—with some divergence in the 
role of the states’ committee, the composition of membership sectors, and the 
 
 114. SIMEONE, supra note 30, at 10; Yoo & Blumsack, supra note 30, at 129 (“[T]he [Members 
Committee] can bypass the PJM board and make filings directly with FERC by exercising its filing 
rights, although it seldom does so.”) (internal citation omitted). 
 115. See supra notes 65–67 and accompanying text. 
 116. See Order on Compliance Filing, PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 129 FERC ¶ 61,250, 62,378 
(Dec. 18, 2009); SIMEONE, supra note 30, at 28. See also Dworkin & Goldwasser, supra note 9, at 571–
77 (discussing role of and challenges facing market monitors); Spence & Prentice, supra note 28, at 132 
(2012) (observing shift from regulatory focus on controlling market power to preventing market 
manipulation). 
 117. See MONITORING ANALYTICS, 
https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/home/index.shtml [https://perma.cc/HK7T-WH63]. 
 118. See SIMEONE, supra note 30, at 28. See also Hartman, supra note 8 at 15 (“Market-design 
problems whose fixes are unpopular with key market stakeholders still go unresolved for extended 
periods . . . .”). 
 119. ORG. OF PJM STATES, INC., https://opsi.us [https://perma.cc/3BFH-7BYC]. See also 
William H. Smith, Jr., Formation and Nurture of a Regional State Committee, 28 ENERGY L.J. 185, 
196–98 (2007) (detailing the creation of MISO’s regional state committee). 
 120. Chen & Murnan, supra note 30, at 13. 
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parsing of section 205 filing rights.121 One region, however, differs dramatically 
and thus merits exploration at greater length. 
2. Keeping it Close: California’s State-Led ISO Governance 
California is a complex case study when it comes to electricity, given that 
its fiascos in the early days of deregulation remain energy law’s most prominent 
cautionary tale (although the state’s 2019 blackouts to avoid wildfires may give 
this superlative a run for its money).122 Most commentators have concluded that 
private manipulation of the state’s nascent state electricity markets played a 
substantial role in these early crises, although market design flaws and weather 
conditions also contributed.123 In light of this history, it is not coincidental that 
California lawmakers have chosen to maintain substantial state control over their 
ISO, and have thus imbued it with a markedly different governance structure.124 
California created its ISO—nicknamed CAISO—as part of its 1995 
restructuring of the state’s electricity system.125 After considerable adjustments 
to the ISO’s initial design, California arrived at its modern ISO structure in the 
early 2000s. CAISO has a five-member board, appointed by the Governor of 
California with approval of the Senate.126 Its decision-making operates similarly 
to “the standard administrative process of a government agency”: CAISO staff 
draft white papers or straw proposals for addressing identified problems, take 
comments from interested parties, and then send the final proposal to the CAISO 
Board of Governors to be voted on.127 The Board is in charge of submitting any 
proposed tariff changes to FERC.128 That means that politically accountable 
 
 121. See infra Part V and Welton, Appendix A, supra note 14. 
 122. On the electricity crisis, see, for example, Timothy P. Duane, Regulation’s Rationale: 
Learning from the California Energy Crisis, 19 YALE J. ON REGUL. 471 (2002); Frank A. Wolak, 
Diagnosing the California Electricity Crisis, ELEC. J., Aug.-Sept. 2003, at 11. See also Order 
Conditionally Accepting the California Independent System Operator’s Electric Tariff Filing to Reflect 
Market Redesign and Technology Upgrade, Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp., 116 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,274, 
62,124 (Sept. 21, 2006) (describing thirty reforms to California’s market over a six-year period to “avoid 
the mistakes of the California energy crisis of 2000-2001”). On the recent blackouts and wildfires, see 
Power Lines Are Still Starting California Wildfires. We Can’t Wait Three Years for a Fix, L.A. TIMES 
(Nov. 29, 2019, 4:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2019-11-29/fix-california-wildfires-
utlities-and-fire-starting-power-lines 
[https://web.archive.org/save/https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2019-11-29/fix-california-
wildfires-utlities-and-fire-starting-power-lines]. 
 123. See Duane, supra note 122, at 507–17. 
 124. E4THE FUTURE, supra note 30, at 10 (noting that California’s single state structure allows 
it to give “considerably more influence to state political entities, such as the California Public Utilities 
Commission and the California Energy Commission, than is generally the case in ISOs”). 
 125. Order Instituting Rulemaking on the Commission’s Proposed Policies Governing 
Restructuring California’s Electric Service Industry and Reforming Regulation, 64 C.P.U.C. 2d 1, 95 
(Dec. 20, 1995). 
 126. James et al., supra note 30, at 67. 
 127. E4THE FUTURE, supra note 30, at 10 (“There is no official membership structure in CAISO 
and there are no limitations on who can be a stakeholder.”). 
 128. Id. 
230 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  109:209 
board members hold all of the section 205 filing rights in California, in contrast 
to PJM’s split rights between an independent board and a private Members 
Committee.129 California’s market monitoring also takes place in-house, through 
a Department of Market Monitoring that produces reports, submits comments, 
and participates in stakeholder processes.130 
Through this RTO structure, California maintains considerable state control 
over the priorities and actions of its RTO—in contrast to the largely private 
structure of other RTOs. This political control has proven important in its efforts 
to decarbonize the grid131—a topic taken up in Part III. 
C. The Modern RTO: Expanding Control 
As RTOs’ governance has matured, these organizations have also grown in 
responsibilities, albeit unevenly across regions. When FERC designed RTOs, the 
agency was focused on the challenge of ensuring non-discriminatory access to 
privately owned and managed transmission infrastructure. To be sure, FERC 
countenanced that RTOs’ role might expand to include administering electricity 
markets.132 But the Commission scarcely devoted any early attention to this 
topic. 
Over time, every RTO has elected to run a set of markets. RTOs administer 
markets for the trading of electricity itself and for ancillary services—basically, 
all the technical support services needed to ensure reliable delivery of power.133 
That means that all RTOs, through their governance processes, must create 
eligibility and bidding rules for these markets—a significant responsibility to 
bestow upon the incumbent group of market participants.134 FERC has also 
steadily expanded RTOs’ role with respect to transmission planning and 
transmission cost allocation, and now requires each region to have detailed 
 
 129. See Order of Proposed Tariff Revisions, supra note 112, at 62,297 n.3. 
 130. See Market Monitoring, CAL. ISO, 
http://www.caiso.com/market/Pages/MarketMonitoring/Default.aspx [https://perma.cc/LZJ5-GCHU]. 
 131. See BENTHAM PAULOS, NEXT 10, A REGIONAL POWER MARKET FOR THE WEST: RISKS 
AND BENEFITS 6 (2018) (“CAISO has a strong connection to state policies and coordinates with state 
energy and environmental agencies.”). 
 132. Order 2000, supra note 11, at 913 (instructing RTOs to consider whether establishing a 
power exchange would “provide additional benefit in its region”). 
 133. See ZHI ZHOU, TODD LEVIN & GUENTER CONZELMANN, ARGONNE NAT’L LAB’Y, 
SURVEY OF U.S. ANCILLARY SERVICES MARKETS (2016); Charles H. Koch, Jr., Control and 
Governance of Transmission Organizations in the Restructured Electricity Industry, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 569, 574 (2000) (discussing the need for reserves). CAISO also runs an innovative “energy 
imbalance market” in the West, where utilities voluntarily share resources in a short-term market to help 
balance loads more efficiently across the region. See Stephanie Lenhart, Natalie Nelson-Marsh, 
Elizabeth J. Wilson & David Solan, Electricity Governance and the Western Energy Imbalance Market 
in the United States: The Necessity of Interorganizational Collaboration, 19 ENERGY RSCH. & SOC. 
SCI. 94, 95 (2016). 
 134. The convoluted mechanisms of “price formation” in these markets are beyond the scope of 
this article, given its focus on governance, but are the subject of a detailed and insightful examination in 
William Boyd, Ways of Price Making and the Challenge of Market Governance in U.S. Energy Law, 
105 MINN. L. REV. 739 (2020). 
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procedures for identifying needed transmission grid expansion and apportioning 
the costs of such lines among member utilities.135 
Moreover, several RTOs have expanded their roles further by assuming 
control over “resource adequacy.” Traditionally, states have been in charge of 
planning to ensure that adequate generation is constructed to meet anticipated 
future electricity demand136—in the industry, this is called ensuring adequate 
“capacity.”137 But some regions, including PJM, New England, and New York, 
have decided that it makes more sense for capacity to be centrally procured.138 
These regions are notable for having far more states that have required 
divestment of generation assets, thereby causing a gap in utility-scale planning 
for resource adequacy.139 As a remedy, after contentious negotiations and 
litigation, these eastern RTOs have instituted centralized, mandatory capacity 
markets.140 In these markets, the RTO assigns a capacity obligation to all utilities 
in the region that serve end-use customers, and then requires utilities to purchase 
adequate capacity (typically three years in advance) through an auction, into 
which generation companies bid.141 Thus these administrative “markets,” instead 
of state planners, largely determine what resources will receive financing in the 
region.142 The layering of capacity markets on top of energy markets has proven 
a controversial and unstable element in the eastern RTOs.143 
 
 135. See FERC Order No. 1000, Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission 
Owning and Operating Public Utilities, 76 Fed. Reg. 49,842, 48,845–46 (Aug. 11, 2011) (codified at 18 
C.F.R. pt. 35 (2019)) [hereinafter Order 1000]. Order 1000 imposes these same transmission obligations 
on regions without an RTO. Id. 
 136. State authority over generation resources is explicit in the Federal Power Act, which 
provides that the Commission “shall not have jurisdiction . . . over facilities used for the generation of 
electric energy . . . .” 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (2018). 
 137. See Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Util. Control v. FERC, 569 F.3d 477, 479 (D.C. Cir. 2009) 
(“‘Capacity’ is not electricity itself but the ability to produce it when necessary.”). 
 138. Otherwise, a regional market may result in a “free rider problem, where some utilities count 
on the capacity they expect others to buy in order to support their own reliability.” Id. Many regions 
cooperated on capacity long before RTOs/ISOs arrived. See id.; SHARON JACOBS & ARI PESKOE, 
GETCHES-WILKINSON CTR., ENERGY EMERGENCIES VS. MANUFACTURED CRISES: THE LIMITS OF 
FEDERAL AUTHORITY TO DISRUPT POWER MARKETS 5 (2019); Dworkin & Goldwasser, supra note 9, 
at 553. 
 139. See Welton, Appendix A, supra note 14 (showing restructuring status by region). 
 140. FERC and the courts have sanctioned RTOs’ usage of these markets, but many states feel 
that they continue to usurp state authority. See, e.g., Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Util. Control, 569 F.3d at 481 
(upholding New England’s capacity market against state claims of RTO jurisdictional overreach); Md. 
Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FERC, 632 F.3d 1283, 1284–85 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (similar regarding PJM). 
 141. I am simplifying my description of capacity markets; for an in-depth exploration, see Order 
on Rehearing, Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator, Inc., 153 FERC ¶ 61,229, 61,246 (Nov. 20, 
2015); James Bushnell, Michaela Flagg & Erin Mansur, Capacity Markets at a Crossroads 24–31 
(Energy Inst. at Haas, Working Paper No. 278, 2017); Chen & Murnan, supra note 30; Joshua C. Macey 
& Jackson Salovaara, Rate Regulation Redux, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 1181 (2020). 
 142. See Chen & Murnan, supra note 30, at 5 n.12 (suggesting these are perhaps more accurately 
called capacity “constructs,” rather than “markets”). 
 143. See infra Parts III.B, V.A. See also SIMEONE, supra note 30, at 16 (noting “[c]onstant 
changes” to the PJM capacity market construct as a challenge for the region). Many have also critiqued 
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In other regions—particularly those where utilities continue to own 
substantial generation—responsibility for resource adequacy has not been given 
over so thoroughly to RTOs. In California, the state public utility commission 
retains control over resource adequacy and plans for future capacity additions.144 
MISO—the Midwestern ISO—runs a voluntary capacity market, so that states 
can instead direct their utilities to procure long-term contracts or self-supply new 
capacity, should they so desire.145 And in the Southwestern Power Pool, resource 
adequacy decisions are explicitly reserved for the Regional State Committee—a 
compromise negotiated by participating states so as not to abdicate so much of 
their power to the RTO.146 As Parts III and IV will describe, the question of who 
controls resource adequacy becomes particularly important under conditions of 
climate change, because the type of resources added to the grid will make or 
break state climate goals, not to mention planetary warming thresholds. 
D. The Other Branches Intervene: Wrinkles in RTO Governance 
The result of RTOs’ expanded suite of responsibilities is that they are now 
the key architects of market structures and market pricing mechanisms for 
electricity—and these markets now substantially influence the course of the 
sector. When FERC designed these creatures, it presumed that it would be able 
to adequately police their development (perhaps, again, a classic parenting 
mistake).147 But of course, FERC cannot design governance arrangements in a 
vacuum: Congress and the courts often act in ways that affect FERC’s best-laid 
plans. This final subsection describes how both judicial and legislative 
developments have complicated FERC’s scheme of private grid governance. 
1. Doctrinal Limitations on FERC’s Oversight Authority 
In the time since RTOs’ inception, a pair of circuit court opinions has 
circumscribed FERC’s ability to manage the governance of these regional 
entities. The first blow in this regard came shortly after RTOs’ formation. In 
2004, FERC decided that California’s method of ISO/RTO board selection148 
was insufficiently independent, and therefore ordered the state to choose its 
 
capacity markets as economically inefficient. See Blumsack, supra note 50, at 176 n.79 (gathering 
critiques). 
 144. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 380 (West 2019); CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, Resource 
Adequacy, https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/ra [https://perma.cc/8B9X-YH45]. 
 145. See Welton, Appendix A, supra note 14. 
 146. See Chen & Murnan, supra note 30, at 8. 
 147. See Dworkin & Goldwasser, supra note 9, at 578 (quoting former FERC Chairman 
Kelliher’s explanation that “RTOs are not self-regulating organizations; they cannot set rules and 
enforce rules unilaterally . . . we set and enforce the rules, so we’re ultimately responsible”). 
 148. Recall that ISOs and RTOs are functionally identical for purposes of this analysis. See supra 
note 8. 
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board “through a method dictated by FERC.”149 California appealed, and in 
2004, the D.C. Circuit held in CAISO v. FERC that FERC has “no authority” to 
“order a public utility subject to its regulation to replace its governing board.”150 
Although FERC claimed this authority under its power to regulate practices 
“affecting” jurisdictional rates, the court found it “crystal clear” that “practice” 
does not extend to “corporate governance or structure.”151 If it did, the court 
reasoned, then what would stop FERC from replacing the board of Duke Energy 
tomorrow?152 (Heaven forbid.153) The court explained that the proper remedy for 
FERC to use, if CAISO’s board appointment rules threaten the ISO’s 
independence, is to revoke approval of the ISO altogether.154 
Although CAISO arguably enlarged FERC’s authority to regulate markets 
and pricing by cementing the agency’s authority over “practices affecting 
rates,”155 it simultaneously narrowed FERC’s authority to regulate RTO 
governance itself. Moreover, the D.C. Circuit—reasoning under the text and 
structure of the Federal Power Act—rendered obvious a point that much energy 
law scholarship seems to gloss over: RTOs are not a special “quasi-
governmental” body in the eyes of the law. FERC can oversee their governance 
only to the same extent as it can traditional investor-owned utilities. This 
formalistic equivalence is at odds with the functional reality of RTOs today, 
which operate as policy-making bodies that scarcely resemble traditional 
utilities.156 
Whereas CAISO limited the scope of RTO practices that FERC can 
regulate, a 2017 opinion placed boundaries on FERC’s ability to regulate even 
those practices and rates clearly within its jurisdiction. In NRG v. FERC, the D.C. 
Circuit considered a challenge to FERC’s longstanding practice of requiring 
 
 149. Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator v. FERC, 372 F.3d 395, 396 (D.C. Cir. 2004). There is a longer 
history of changes in California’s board formation procedures, see id. at 396–98, but I dispense with 
these details. 
 150. Id. at 398. 
 151. Id. at 399, 400. 
 152. Id. at 404. 
 153. See Fred Clasen-Kelly & Sarah Skinner, ‘Taking Care of the People Wasn’t a Priority.’ Is 
Duke Energy to Blame for Flooding?, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (June 24, 2019, 5:16 PM), 
charlotteobserver.com/news/local/article231820373.html 
[https://web.archive.org/save/https://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/local/article231820373.html]; 
Herman K. Trabish, Duke Pleads Guilty to Nine Coal Ash Charges Stemming from Dan River Spill, 
UTIL. DIVE (May 15, 2015), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/duke-pleads-guilty-to-nine-coal-ash-
charges-stemming-from-dan-river-spill/398144 [https://perma.cc/4U9Z-YEGM]; David Zucchino, 
Duke Energy Fined $102 Million for Polluting Rivers with Coal Ash, L.A. TIMES (May 14, 2015, 7:01 
PM), latimes.com/nation/la-na-duke-energy-coal-ash-20150514-story.html 
[https://web.archive.org/web/20150515040125/latimes.com/nation/la-na-duke-energy-coal-ash-
20150514-story.html]. 
 154. Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator, 372 F.3d at 404. FERC expressed concern about undertaking this 
“drastic remedy.” Id. 
 155. See Joel B. Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid, 49 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1783, 1832 (2016) (arguing for this reading of CAISO). 
 156. See infra Part III. 
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RTOs to modify their filings to gain regulatory approval under section 205. In 
that case, several companies challenged FERC’s modifications to a PJM section 
205 filing that adjusted the region’s capacity market.157 The court held, in brief, 
that the Commission exceeded its legal authority by requiring more than “minor” 
modifications to the RTO’s proposal, even though the RTO had accepted 
FERC’s proposed modifications.158 
NRG thus further limits FERC’s oversight authority of RTOs, as it means 
that FERC must approach RTOs’ proposed tariffs essentially on a “take it or 
leave it” basis.159 That’s a big deal in a field where stakeholder negotiations and 
board deliberation can drag on for years. Without the ability to propose anything 
beyond “minor” modifications, FERC has at its disposal only the drastic remedy 
of completely denying an RTO’s long-negotiated proposal, thus leaving to fester 
whatever problem the proposal was designed to address.160 The combined effect 
of CAISO and NRG, then, is to render FERC unable to reform RTO governance 
at the same time that it must wholly accept or reject whatever proposals come 
out of RTO governance arrangements. 
2. Merger Mania 
These doctrinal limitations on FERC’s RTO oversight have been 
compounded by legislative developments that have transformed public utilities 
themselves. In 2005, Congress repealed the longstanding Public Utilities 
Holding Company Act (PUHCA), which since 1935 had prevented mergers 
between non-geographically contiguous utilities.161 Since PUHCA’s repeal, 
there has been explosive growth in utility mergers—with substantial collateral 
consequences for RTO governance. 
PUHCA emerged from the crisis in utility holding companies that 
contributed to the stock market crash of 1929, which precipitated the Great 
Depression.162 During an exhaustive investigation, the Federal Trade 
Commission found rampant abuses of the holding company structure, in which 
a few major companies controlled vast numbers of smaller utilities and ancillary 
businesses.163 The holding companies were accused of running a pyramid 
 
 157. NRG Power Mktg. v. FERC, 862 F.3d 108, 110 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
 158. Id. at 110, 114. 
 159. NRG Power Mktg. clarifies that FERC’s role in evaluating section 205 filings is “passive 
and reactive.” Id. at 114. 
 160. Cf. Order on Tariff Filing, ISO New England, Inc., 162 FERC ¶ 61,205 (Comm’r Glick, 
dissenting in part). To be sure, FERC may retain some backroom bargaining authority, but even this is 
diminished when an RTO board or RTO stakeholders know that FERC is eager to see changes occur—
since they also know the agency is thus likely to approve whatever proposal the RTO sends its way. 
 161. See Public Utility Act of 1935, ch. 687, 49 Stat. 803, repealed by Energy Policy Act of 2005, 
Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 13201 et seq. (2018)). 
 162. See Roberta S. Karmel, Is the Public Utility Holding Company Act a Model for Breaking 
Up the Banks That Are Too-Big-to-Fail?, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 821, 845–46 (2011). 
 163. See H. R. REP. NO. 827-73 (1934); Karmel, supra note 162, at 849 (describing the main 
“evils” the FTC investigation uncovered). 
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scheme in which they watered down stock and failed to maintain reasonable debt 
to equity ratios.164 PUHCA attempted to limit these practices and protect 
investors by eliminating the use of holding companies except in the case of 
geographically contiguous utilities, where joint ownership was understood to 
bring economies of scale.165 These restrictions followed from the Progressive 
philosophy—championed by Louis Brandeis—that giant monopoly holding 
companies presented a “[c]urse of [b]igness,” threatening democracy by 
eliminating competition and accruing outsized political and economic power.166 
Intellectual currents shifted in the second half of the twentieth century, such 
that “bigness” no longer reigned as a concern in antitrust law.167 These changes 
in antitrust theories are not typically connected with RTOs or the energy sector 
because regulated utilities are largely insulated from antitrust challenges.168 But 
the movement has nevertheless had dramatic impacts upon the electricity 
industry, since the same intellectual trend manifested itself in public utility law 
through the demise of PUHCA. Once “bigness” was no longer a concern, the 
1935 prohibition on non-contiguous utility mergers lost merit.169 In a 1995 
report, the Securities and Exchange Commission found that “the conduct that 
gave rise to the Act ha[d] all but disappeared,” and that PUHCA had become a 
 
 164. See CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL33739, THE REPEAL OF THE PUBLIC UTILITY HOLDING 
COMPANY ACT OF 1935 (PUHCA 1935) AND ITS IMPACT ON ELECTRIC AND GAS UTILITIES 3 (2006); 
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N DIV. OF INV. MGMT., THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC-UTILITY HOLDING 
COMPANIES 14–15 (1995); Norman S. Buchanan, The Public Utility Holding Company Problem, 25 
CALIF. L. REV. 517, 520–22 (1937); David Ferber, Arthur Blasberg, Jr. & Melvin Katz, Conflicts of 
Interest in Reorganization Proceedings Under the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 and 
Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 319, 322 (1959). 
 165. Public Utility Act of 1935, ch. 687, 47 Stat. 1844 § 2(a)(29) repealed by Energy Policy Act 
of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 13201 et seq. (2018)) 
(defining “integrated public-utility system” as one “whose utility assets . . . are physically 
interconnected . . .”). See also Douglas W. Hawes, Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935—Fossil 
or Foil?, 30 VAND. L. REV. 605, 606, 609 (1977). 
 166. See Louis D. Brandeis, A Curse of Bigness, HARPER’S WKLY., Jan. 10, 1914, at 18; William 
A. Gregory & Rennard Strickland, Hugo Black’s Congressional Investigation of Lobbying and the 
Public Utilities Holding Company Act: A Historical View of the Power Trust, New Deal Politics, and 
Regulatory Propaganda, 29 OKLA. L. REV. 543, 548–49 (1976) (tying PUHCA to the Brandeisian 
movement to reign in “bigness”); Markian M.W. Melnyk & William S. Lamb, PUHCA’s Gone: What 
is Next for Holding Companies?, 27 ENERGY L.J. 1, 5 (2006) (“PUHCA was as much about a desire to 
control the corrosive effects of powerful business interests . . . on the democratic process, as it was about 
promoting economical and efficient utility service throughout the nation . . . .”). 
 167. As several scholars have documented, beginning in the 1960s, largely under the intellectual 
leadership of Robert Bork, antitrust theory experienced a marked turn. Whereas early courts and scholars 
saw antitrust laws as serving a multiplicity of ends, Bork and his progeny asserted that antitrust should 
focus exclusively on protection of consumer welfare. As this new interpretation of the goals of antitrust 
curried favor in the courts and enforcement agencies, concerns about the “bigness” of corporations as a 
problem in and of itself fell away. See WU, supra note 6, at 102–18; Khan & Vaheesan, supra note 6, at 
268–74; Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 1051–52 (1979). 
 168. See Vaheesan, supra note 28, at 940–42 (collecting circuit court cases holding regulated 
utilities exempt from antitrust challenges). 
 169. See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N DIV. OF INV. MGMT., supra note 164, at 60 (rejecting theories 
of regulation based on “preconceived notions of size.”). 
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“barrier to innovation and competition in the utility industry.”170 In 2005, 
Congress did away with PUHCA in its entirety, lifting the substantive 
prohibitions on holding companies’ ownership of utilities and other 
businesses.171 
The repeal resulted in an explosion in utility-sector mergers.172 As of 2016, 
there were fifty remaining utility systems, down from hundreds a few decades 
earlier.173 In theory, the fact that FERC still must approve utility mergers could 
serve as a check on consolidation. But FERC evaluates utility mergers under 
Federal Power Act section 203, whose “public interest” standard has been 
interpreted to require the agency to ensure only that the merger will do “no harm” 
to competition within the industry.174 FERC applies this standard in a piecemeal 
and lenient fashion, refusing to examine broader industry impacts in deciding 
individual applications.175 
Consequently, utility mega-holding companies have returned.176 There is a 
certain irony in the fact that deregulatory theories led FERC to turn increasingly 
to competition as the basis for ensuring “just and reasonable” rates, while also 
leading Congress to lift the prohibitions that had ensured robust competition in 
the industry over the previous eighty years.177 To be sure, some utility mergers 
create efficiencies through economies of scale or complementary business 
ventures.178 But they also create challenges by concentrating economic and 
 
 170. Id. at 1, 7, 60. See also CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 164, at 1; Richard L. Gordon, The 
Public Utility Holding Company Act: The Easy Step in Electric Utility Regulatory Reform, 15 REGUL. 
58, 58 (1992) (“PUHCA is an act of questionable original value and clear current redundancy. It should 
be totally repealed.”); Lawrence J. Spiwak, Expanding the FERC’s Jurisdiction to Review Utility 
Mergers, 14 ENERGY L.J. 385, 385 (1993) (describing “heavy criticism” of PUHCA during the early 
1990s). 
 171. See Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594, §§ 1261–77 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 13201 et seq. (2018)); FERC Order No. 667, Repeal of the Public Utility 
Holding Company Act of 1935 and Enactment of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 2005, 70 
Fed. Reg. at 75,592 (Dec. 20, 2005) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 365–66 (2019)) [hereinafter Order 667] 
(implementing new reporting requirements). 
 172. See Jack Azagury, Walt Shill & Ted Walker, The Race to Consolidate, PUB. UTILS. 
FORTNIGHTLY MAG., (Sept. 2012), https://www.fortnightly.com/fortnightly/2012/09/race-consolidate 
[https://perma.cc/A62H-A5Q6] (“[I]n the past 18 months alone we have seen a greater growth in the 
concentration of the top players in the industry than in the preceding 10 years.”); Melnyk & Lamb, supra 
note 166, at 1–2 (explaining that until PUHCA’s repeal, utility acquisitions were limited “principally” 
by the statute). 
 173. Scott Hempling, Inconsistent with the Public Interest: FERC’s Three Decades of Deference 
to Electricity Consolidation, 39 ENERGY L.J. 233, 251 n.32 (2018). 
 174. 16 U.S.C. § 824b (2018); Hempling, supra note 173, at 239. 
 175. See Hempling, supra note 173, at 308–09. 
 176. See id. at 233. 
 177. Indeed, Sandeep Vaheesan has pointed out that Alfred Kahn, one of the godfathers of 
competition in the electricity industry, “stressed the importance of antitrust enforcement in deregulated 
markets” to ensure competition. Vaheesan, supra note 28, at 923 n.2. 
 178. See, e.g., Raymond S. Hartman, The Efficiency Effects of Electric Utility Mergers: Lessons 
from Statistical Cost Analysis, 17 ENERGY L.J. 425, 427–31 (1996) (discussing historical utility mergers 
that increased the size of generating units “to capture increasing returns to scale, thereby lowering 
average generation costs,” and developing factors that may allow more modern utilities to capitalize 
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political power in a small number of companies—not least for theories of RTO 
governance, which rely upon internal industry checks to legitimate RTO 
decision-making.179 These internal checks presume opposing interests that do not 
exist because holding companies have consolidated across demand- and supply-
side affiliates. 
The holding company resurgence appears even more problematic when one 
looks at patterns of infrastructure investment. In 2018, independent power 
producers owned 87% of solar and wind energy developments in the United 
States, whereas regulated utilities owned only 13%.180 Post-PUHCA, holding 
companies can own both these categories of business. But they have increasingly 
concentrated their interests within the regulated utility space: at the end of 2018, 
independent power entities made up less than 12% of their overall portfolios, 
whereas regulated utilities comprised nearly 69%.181 That means that the largest 
utility holding companies have interests predominantly opposed to renewable 
energy development. Moreover, many companies focused on independent power 
production concentrate their fossil fuel holdings within certain RTOs, giving 
them a vested interest in shaping particular regions’ market rules.182 
Part IV will consider in more detail how merger activity undercuts the 
theories behind RTOs’ governance design. First, it is time to examine how 
RTOs’ privatized stakeholder model of governance—expanded over time to 
include market administration and resource adequacy under shrinking doctrinal 
oversight—plays out on matters of substantive import in modern grid 
governance. 
III. 
RTOS CONFRONT THE CLIMATE IMPERATIVE 
Perhaps it is just dumb bad luck—but it may be less coincidental—that the 
formation of RTOs and mounting policy concern over anthropogenic climate 
 
upon economies of scale). But see Hempling, supra note 173, at 234, 238 (pointing out that mergers can 
also create “diseconomies of scale due to non-integrated operations”). 
 179. Hempling, supra note 173, at 238, 271. See also infra Part III. 
 180. Calculations derived from data in U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ELECTRIC POWER ANNUAL 
2018, tbls. 3.2.B. & 3.3.B. (2019), https://www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/pdf/epa.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/PK6N-X63L]. 
 181. EDISON ELEC. INST., 2018 FINANCIAL REVIEW: ANNUAL REPORT OF THE U.S. INVESTOR-
OWNED ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY 37. 
 182. For example, Calpine, the independent power production company driving anti-renewable 
reforms in PJM, see infra Part III.C, owns considerable renewable generation in the western United 
States, but over 99% of its eastern holdings are concentrated in natural gas. See Our Fleet, CALPINE, 
https://www.calpine.com/operations/power-operations/our-fleet [https://perma.cc/AF5U-T9YB]. 
NRG, another independent power proponent of anti-renewable reforms in eastern markets, similarly 
owns predominantly natural gas resources in the east. See Leading the Nation with an Integrated Power 
Plant Portfolio, NRG, https://www.nrg.com/generation/asset-map.html [https://perma.cc/QT9J-
KNC4]. 
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change share a similar timeline.183 Consequently, RTOs have had to adapt to an 
energy law landscape that has embraced a shifting set of priorities since the early 
2000s. As described in this Section, RTO governance has increasingly resisted 
these changed priorities, especially when they threaten incumbent members of 
the energy sector. However, not all RTOs have struggled equally, suggesting that 
certain governance models may be better suited to the climate change era.184 
A. The Link Between Grid Governance and Climate Change 
The electricity sector has been appropriately called the “linchpin of efforts 
to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions,” central to “[v]irtually all credible 
pathways to climate stabilization.”185 For decarbonization to succeed, the U.S. 
transportation and heating sectors will need to electrify—creating both 
opportunities and pressure for the electricity sector to scale up and clean up at 
the same time.186 Most experts agree that the United States’ electricity sector 
needs to run on 100 percent clean energy by 2050, if not earlier, to achieve 
internationally established climate change goals.187 Despite renewables’ recent 
growth, there is a long way to go to reach these kinds of numbers.188 In 2019, 
fossil fuels produced 63% of U.S. electricity (with coal at 23.5% and natural gas 
at 38.5%)—while nuclear energy produced 19.7%, hydropower and wind each 
produced around 7%, and solar energy produced only 1.8%.189 
As grid managers, RTOs play a key role in enabling sectoral 
transformation. This role is complicated, however, by the fact that neither FERC 
 
 183. The signature global climate convention—the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change—was signed in 1992, and the follow-on Kyoto Protocol was signed in 1997. Kyoto 
Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Feb. 16, 2005, 2303 
U.N.T.S. 162; United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Mar. 21, 1992, 1771 
U.N.T.S. 107. If one sees rising emissions and deregulation as products of the same neoliberal economic 
agenda, then their contemporaneous timing appears to be part of a concerted effort toward economic 
growth at all costs. See generally NAOMI KLEIN, THIS CHANGES EVERYTHING: CAPITALISM VS. THE 
CLIMATE (2014) (linking these challenges); ANDREAS MALM, FOSSIL CAPITAL: THE RISE OF STEAM 
POWER AND THE ROOTS OF GLOBAL WARMING 393 (2016) (arguing that climate change is a “lifting of 
the veil on two centuries of fossil capital . . .”). 
 184. See infra Part V. 
 185. Jesse D. Jenkins, Max Luke & Samuel Thernstrom, Getting to Zero Carbon Emissions in 
the Electric Power Sector, 2 JOULE 2498, 2498 (2018). 
 186. See Alexandra B. Klass, Expanding the U.S. Electric Transmission and Distribution Grid 
to Meet Deep Decarbonization Goals, 47 ENV’T. L. REP. 10,749, 10,751 (2017) (explaining that to reach 
“deep decarbonization,” electricity generation “would need to approximately double . . . by 2050 while 
its carbon intensity is reduced to 3-10% of its current level”). See also Jenkins et al., supra note 185, at 
2,506. 
 187. See Jenkins et al., supra note 185 (metareview of forty studies of such “deep 
decarbonization”). Of course, if the United States alone decarbonized, it would not avoid these 
consequences—that requires a larger diplomatic effort. 
 188. See Michael B. Gerrard, Legal Pathways for a Massive Increase in Utility-Scale Renewable 
Generation Capacity, 47 ENV’T L. REP. 10,591, 10,591 (2017). 
 189. See What Is U.S. Electricity Generation by Energy Source?, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=427&t=3 [https://perma.cc/K933-VHZ9]. 
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nor RTOs have an independent mandate to decarbonize.190 Moreover, the 
Federal Power Act explicitly leaves decisions over the electric generation mix to 
the states.191 For this reason, those within RTOs often describe these 
organizations as policy-takers, not policy-makers, in charge of making the 
markets and grid function well in light of whatever policies their member states 
adopt.192 
Adopt they have: in the last two decades, twenty-nine states have required 
their utilities to secure an increasing percentage of their electricity from 
renewable energy sources;193 every state has put in place laws to encourage 
efficiency and conservation;194 and many states have adopted a range of tax 
incentives, special pricing arrangements, and other laws to help promote rooftop 
solar, energy storage, electric vehicles, offshore wind, and other promising 
decarbonization technologies.195 More recently, a spate of states has upped the 
ambition of their renewable targets, aiming to reach 100 percent clean electricity 
generation by 2040–2050—with many more considering similar legislation.196 
To reach these goals will require the affirmative support of “policy-taking” 
RTOs.197 RTOs will have to adjust their markets and dispatch to accommodate 
the expected influx of renewable energy. Wind and solar are variable 
resources—they only produce energy when the wind is blowing or the sun is 
shining.198 To integrate these resources, RTOs will have to reform their systems 
to better model renewable energy’s output; reward other sources for being 
 
 190. Most commentators accept that decarbonization is not within FERC’s charge to maintain 
“just and reasonable” rates—although some argue that FERC could justifiably incorporate this goal. See, 
e.g., Christopher J. Bateman & James T. B. Tripp, Toward Greener FERC Regulation of the Power 
Industry, 38 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 275, 278 (2014) (urging FERC to incorporate environmental 
considerations into market design); Eisen, supra note 155, at 1786 (urging FERC to consider adopting 
a “carbon adder” to market pricing). For purposes of this article, I accept FERC’s movement in this 
direction as unlikely. See Rich Glick & Matthew Christiansen, FERC and Climate Change, 40 ENERGY 
L.J. 1, 5, 30–33 (2019) (explaining FERC’s role as a fuel-neutral regulator that is not in charge of setting 
priorities for the generation mix, but can and should accommodate state climate priorities). 
 191. See 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (2018). 
 192. See Stafford & Wilson, supra note 18, at 229 (quoting RTO staffer explaining: “We are a 
taker of policy not a maker of policy . . . We don’t create policy. We attempt to interpret policy as handed 
to us.”). See also Order on Tariff Filing, ISO New England, Inc., 162 FERC ¶ 61,205, 61,226 (2018) 
(FERC insisting that the agency remains resource neutral); Our Three Critical Roles, ISO NEW 
ENGLAND, https://www.iso-ne.com/about/what-we-do/three-roles [https://perma.cc/XB2A-UWVV]. 
 193. N.C. CLEAN ENERGY TECH. CTR., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO 
STANDARD POLICIES (2018), http://ncsolarcen-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-
content/uploads/2018/10/Renewable-Portfolio-Standards-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/S4W7-U3YV]. 
 194. See Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency, N.C. CLEAN ENERGY TECH. 
CTR., https://www.dsireusa.org [https://perma.cc/CM9G-CQ2S]. 
 195. See Jim Rossi, Carbon Taxation by Regulation, 102 MINN. L. REV. 277, 301–12 (2017). See 
also Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency, supra note 194. 
 196. See Pyper, supra note 17. 
 197. I return to contest this RTO self-characterization infra Part III.B. 
 198. See E. ELA, V. DIAKOV, E. IBANEZ & M. HEANEY, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB’Y, 
IMPACTS OF VARIABILITY AND UNCERTAINTY IN SOLAR PHOTOVOLTAIC GENERATION AT MULTIPLE 
TIMESCALES 8 (2013). 
240 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  109:209 
available to act as flexible, fast-ramping backups; and better integrate demand-
side technologies to smooth fluctuations in energy supply.199 
At the same time, RTOs will have to support decreased reliance on natural 
gas to power the U.S. electricity sector. This objective is politically fraught, 
given that companies are building long-lived infrastructure in the natural gas 
sector at a rapid clip.200 These companies will not easily relinquish the value of 
these assets, yet this infrastructure cannot be used for its useful life if we are to 
confront the climate imperative (at least not without substantial advancements in 
carbon capture and storage, which is not yet adequately commercialized).201 
The expansion of renewable energy will also require construction of a lot 
more transmission infrastructure to connect remote solar and wind resources to 
population centers.202 In their role as regional transmission planning 
coordinators,203 RTOs’ willingness to enable maximum transmission expansion 
will help determine the viability of a renewables-heavy electricity sector. 
In sum, if the United States is to have any chance at decarbonizing at the 
rate necessary to avoid catastrophic climate change,204 then RTOs must play a 
pivotal role. The remainder of this section explores how RTOs have responded 
as putative “policy-takers” to the climate change priorities established by state 
and federal entities. 
 
 199. See Jenkins et al., supra note 185, at 2507 (explaining need for more “flexible and 
responsive” power systems in the future). 
 200. See Christopher Serkin & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Prospective Grandfathering: 
Anticipating the Energy Transition Problem, 102 MINN. L. REV. 1019, 1021–22 (2018); Chloe Holden, 
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[https://perma.cc/AG7J-PCC5] (describing how Duke Energy’s plans to build gas infrastructure are 
incompatible with the company’s climate change goals). 
 201. See CHARLES TEPLIN, MARK DYSON, ALEX ENGEL & GRANT GLAZER, ROCKY 
MOUNTAIN INST., THE GROWING MARKET FOR CLEAN ENERGY PORTFOLIOS: ECONOMIC 
OPPORTUNITIES FOR A SHIFT FROM NEW GAS-FIRED GENERATION TO CLEAN ENERGY ACROSS THE 
UNITED STATES ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY 6– 7 (2019) (describing how gas is no longer cost-competitive 
with clean energy); William Boyd, supra note 13, at 1624 (discussing this dynamic); Emily Hammond 
& Jim Rossi, Stranded Costs and Grid Decarbonization, 82 BROOKLYN L. REV. 645, 647 (2017); 
Jenkins et al., supra note 185, at 2506 (supporting carbon capture and storage as a solution); Serkin & 
Vandenbergh, supra note 200, at 1022 (discussing this challenge). 
 202. See Jenkins et al., supra note 185, at 2506; Klass, supra note 186; Alexander E. MacDonald, 
Christopher T.M. Clack, Anneliese Alexander, Adam Dunbar, James Wilczak & Yuanfu Xie, Future 
Cost-Competitive Electricity Systems and Their Impact on US CO2 Emissions, 6 NATURE CLIMATE 
CHANGE 526, 526 (2016). 
 203. See infra Part III.B for more detail. 
 204. See Jenkins et al., supra note 185, at 2498. 
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B. RTOs as Heel-Draggers 
On the whole, RTOs are inveterate stallers when it comes to integrating 
new resources that would improve their markets but threaten incumbents’ bottom 
line. This is not a minor flaw: RTO heel-dragging causes years, if not decades, 
of delay in critical market improvements, costing billions of dollars and causing 
significant greenhouse gas emissions.205 It is perverse that our key grid 
operators—ostensibly created to improve competition and efficiency—should 
have to be forced, through years-long processes, to make design improvements 
that benefit consumers and the environment. 
RTOs’ dilatory tactics have manifested in several technically dense 
controversies, which I outline here only in broad strokes. (Indeed, likely one of 
the reasons that RTOs get away with these delays is that these topics are so 
complicated that they confound efforts at media attention or civic engagement.) 
The first such controversy is over what is known as demand response. Currently, 
most customers pay a per-kilowatt-hour fee for electricity that does not shift over 
the course of the day, week, month, or year—such that their demand fluctuates 
mostly in response to the weather and their daily schedules. 206 This causes major 
spikes in demand during peak hot and cold periods, and supply must be adequate 
to cover these spikes.207 To alleviate the costs of building supply that operates 
only at peak periods—and to help integrate more renewables onto the grid—
economists have long called for making electricity demand more responsive to 
changes in supply.208 However, demand response is less popular among 
transmission and generation owners. Because demand response reduces the 
amount of infrastructure that needs to be built, and serves as a balancing resource 
 
 205. See STEVE DAHLKE & MATT PROROK, GREAT PLAINS INST., CONSUMER SAVINGS, PRICE, 
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SAVINGS OFFERED BY COMPETITION IN ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION: EXPERIENCE TO DATE AND THE 
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S.A. Newell, Fostering Economic Demand Response in the Midwest ISO, 35 ENERGY 1544, 1544 
(2009). 
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 208. See Severin Borenstein, Michael Jaske & Arthur Rosenfeld, Dynamic Pricing, Advanced 
Metering, and Demand Response in Electricity Markets 5 (Ctr. for the Study of Energy Mkts., Working 
Paper No. 105, 2002); James Bushnell, Benjamin F. Hobbs & Frank A. Wolak, When it Comes to 
Demand Response, Is FERC Its Own Worst Enemy?, 22 ELEC. J. 9, 9–10 (2009). 
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for renewable resources that may be competing with traditional fossil fuel 
resources, these entities see it as a threat to their revenue streams.209 
Although FERC has eschewed any specific role as an environmental 
regulator, it has embraced demand response as a means of ensuring “just and 
reasonable rates.”210 RTOs, though, have on the whole been far less enthusiastic 
about integrating demand response. To force RTOs’ hand, FERC in 2008 
required RTOs to amend their market rules to “accept bids from demand 
response resources, on a basis comparable to any other resources . . . .”211 The 
Commission surely hoped that was a job complete. But many RTOs continued 
to disadvantage demand response resources by paying less for reductions in 
megawatts demanded than was paid to suppliers for providing megawatts.212 To 
remedy this deficiency, just three years later FERC had to promulgate another 
rule that required RTOs to compensate demand response “at the market price for 
energy.”213 Power generators challenged this order in court and the Supreme 
Court ultimately upheld it.214 
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16,667. 
 213. Order 745, supra note 212, at 16,658. FERC also imposed a “cost-effectiveness” test to 
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system. Id. at 16,659. 
 214. FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 775 (2016) (“If rewarded at [locational 
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Still, in a tale not unlike the one plaguing women in American 
workplaces,215 demand response’s “equal pay for equal work” fight within RTOs 
is not over. Additional complex barriers remain across regions.216 At the same 
time, new demand-side technologies have emerged that require their own 
concerted battles to overcome RTO resistance. In particular, attention has 
focused in the last several years on energy storage. Energy storage is often called 
the “holy grail” of clean energy efforts because of its ability to balance out 
renewable energy supply by storing it during periods of abundance, and releasing 
it during periods of under-supply.217 
Given these myriad benefits, FERC has been particularly interested in 
better integrating storage into energy markets. Certain RTO members, however, 
have considerably less interest because storage lessens the need for natural gas. 
The natural gas industry argues that it has an important role in a high-renewables 
grid, because as a fast-ramping, dispatchable resource, it balances out the 
intermittency of renewables.218 But storage can play this same role, emissions-
free—not to mention that it can also reduce and replace transmission and 
distribution infrastructure.219 If the storage industry can capitalize upon these 
many value streams, it will become a significant threat to incumbent resources.220 
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For these reasons, FERC again has had to force RTOs into action.221 In 
2018, FERC ordered RTOs to create a “participation model” for storage to 
remedy unreasonable market barriers that regions have erected.222 But many 
RTO responses to the order have been underwhelming, with recent compliance 
filings clinging to discriminatory practices.223 For example, PJM’s filing 
contained a requirement that storage must be able to run for a minimum of ten 
hours to qualify as a Capacity Storage Resource—a requirement the Energy 
Storage Association called unnecessary and discriminatory. FERC has since 
initiated a paper hearing to determine whether this requirement is warranted.224 
None too pleased with these developments, industry incumbents also took 
to the courts to stave off storage as a competitor, although with limited success: 
in July 2020, the D.C. Circuit quickly dispensed with a challenge brought by 
several RTO member utilities and their trade groups that contested FERC’s 
jurisdiction to force the participation of storage resources in wholesale 
markets.225 
More recently, FERC has acted to integrate distributed energy resources 
(DER) into markets. DER is a technical term for small-scale generation devices 
like rooftop solar panels.226 DER can play a similar role to storage in balancing 
energy supply and demand and improving the reliability and efficiency of the 
grid, especially when aggregated into larger units that can participate in RTO 
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markets. 227 DER’s potential in this regard led FERC, in 2020, to issue Order 
2222, which requires RTOs to revise their tariffs to allow “distributed energy 
resource aggregations” to participate fully in RTO markets.228 FERC had to foist 
this reform upon certain of its RTOs, which insisted that in spite of DER’s 
significant growth in the last decade and projected “explosive growth” in the 
next several years,229 “DER programing must not be done in haste.”230 Again, 
then, we see at least some RTOs hesitant to independently advance resources 
that could cut emissions and lower prices by reducing the need to build 
generation, transmission, and distribution infrastructure. Whether these regions 
will respond to FERC’s order with robust reforms remains to be seen, but past 
practice leaves room for doubt.231 
The final example of RTO heel-dragging that bears mention is transmission 
policy. As discussed in Part III.A, building more large-scale transmission will be 
key to integrating a large amount of renewable energy into the system.232 To be 
fair, RTOs do not bear most of the blame for the challenges plaguing 
transmission planning and construction—states, utilities, FERC, certain 
environmental groups, Congress, and the courts play major roles.233 But RTOs 
have exacerbated the problem by continuing to erect barriers to non-incumbent 
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transmission companies competing to build new transmission lines.234 Moreover, 
as I have catalogued elsewhere, they have resisted creating planning processes 
that weigh “non-transmission alternatives” fairly.235 
These examples make clear the extent to which RTOs are obfuscating when 
they claim not to be policy-makers. Clearly, the market rules established by RTO 
governance processes have profound impacts on which resources power the U.S. 
electricity grid. Indeed, as FERC has explained, the reason that markets have 
discriminated against demand response, storage, and DER is that barriers “can 
emerge when the rules governing participation in those markets are designed 
for traditional resources and in effect limit the services that emerging 
technologies can provide.”236 Note the passive voice: the barriers just 
“emerged.” Such passive problem-creation is the predictable result of a member-
driven process for raising and vetting issues, where incumbents have both reason 
and power to block the entry of new competitor technologies. 
C. RTOs as Anticompetitive Forces against Renewable Energy 
When it comes to demand response, storage, DER, and transmission policy, 
RTOs have been slow and tepid. When it comes to renewable energy, certain 
RTOs have been aggressive and misguided. Treatment of renewables has been 
particularly alarming in ISO New England (ISO-NE) and PJM—two of the 
RTOs with mandatory capacity markets.237 These two RTOs have recently 
instituted capacity market reforms that make it significantly harder for 
renewables to compete in their markets—thereby putting aggressive state 
renewable energy goals at risk. 
These reforms are tediously complex; for present purposes, I stick to the 
basics. These RTOs have asserted that the market participation of resources that 
receive “state support” results in “price suppression and thus negatively 
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impact[s] the market’s ability to retain and justly compensate needed existing 
resources and to attract new, competitively-compensated resources.”238 In 
plainer speak, natural gas generators in particular are worried that the entry of 
substantial renewable resources into the market might lower market prices 
enough to drive fossil fuel companies out of business, or halt future construction 
of fossil fuel-fired generation. Consequently, these RTOs have pushed for 
reforms that limit the ability of “state-supported resources” to participate in their 
markets.239 Curiously, though, these RTOs define “state support” only to include 
certain state-driven policies that tend to promote clean energy, while leaving out 
many long-standing federal and state subsidies to fossil fuel resources.240 
FERC approved these changes to ISO New England’s capacity market in 
2018 and finalized its approval of PJM’s capacity market redesign in 2020.241 In 
fact, FERC went further than PJM had even requested, extending exclusions on 
full market participation to a host of additional resources receiving state 
support.242 In dissent, FERC Commissioner Richard Glick asserted that the 
majority’s logic now “permits the Commission to zero out any state effort to 
address the externalities associated with sales of electricity.”243 Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, given the breadth of this order, states and other parties swiftly 
filed challenges to it in a set of cases that has been consolidated in the Seventh 
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Circuit.244 If upheld, this order—like its counterpart in New England—will make 
it difficult for renewable energy to participate in the regional capacity market—
which in turn will make it considerably more expensive for states to meet their 
clean energy objectives.245 Many worry that the orders will have a particularly 
pernicious effect on the development of promising but still-nascent technologies 
like offshore wind, which several East Coast states are actively promoting 
through state laws and policies.246 
These reforms represent the antithesis of RTOs acting in their asserted role 
of policy-taker. Numerous states have decided—under their well-established 
Federal Power Act authority to control their own generation—that they prefer a 
generation mix that emits less carbon dioxide, and they have used lawful state 
policies to promote these ends.247 RTOs’ market reforms are protectionist 
maneuvers by incumbents—in particular, fossil-fuel generation owners—to prop 
up the fossil fuel industry against encroachment by these resources. RTOs have 
identified no legitimate threat that renewables pose to their capacity markets, 
beyond vague worries about the “integrity of competition” or “investor 
confidence.”248 
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But these market operators should not want fossil fuel generators to be 
confident in building new, polluting generation for states that do not want it or 
need it.249 There is no evidence that either New England or the mid-Atlantic faces 
anything approaching a capacity deficit. Quite the opposite: during a ten-year 
period of essentially flat demand growth between 2008 and 2017, PJM added 
fifteen thousand megawatts of largely unnecessary new generation—almost all 
of it natural gas.250 These additions have caused the region to substantially 
exceed expert recommendations of needed capacity additions. The North 
American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) is a standard-setting 
organization charged with determining the target reserve margin for each region 
of the United States—that is, the percentage of supply that each region should 
maintain above peak demand to ensure reliability.251 In summer 2018, NERC set 
PJM’s target reserve margin at 16.1%.252 PJM’s actual margin that summer was 
32.8%, and the region’s anticipated reserve margin in 2021 is an astounding 
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45%.253 Across regions with capacity markets, similar results predominate—
with the consequence that consumers are paying over $1 billion each year for 
unnecessary fossil fuel investments.254 
All that said, I do not mean to suggest that grid operators face no challenges 
in integrating renewables. But the legitimate concerns raised about renewables, 
including fast ramps and resource seasonality, cannot be appropriately addressed 
through the crude mechanism of capacity market payments.255 What is needed 
to address these challenges is a focus on enhancing the grid’s flexibility—a 
feature that many fossil fuel plants receiving capacity payments do not support, 
and which most RTOs have consequently failed to adopt as a key system 
criterion.256 
One final and growing set of RTO actions that discriminates against 
renewables bears highlighting: the recent obsession with “fuel security.” The 
plans hatched by President Donald Trump and the Department of Energy to 
subsidize coal and nuclear power as “fuel-secure” resources have received 
significant attention the last couple of years.257 None of these plans has come to 
fruition, largely because FERC in 2018 did not accept that these resources—
whose distinguishing characteristic is that they can store large quantities of fuel 
on-site—especially contribute to the resiliency of the grid.258 Yet these same 
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concepts have motivated changes in RTO rules that privilege traditional 
resources over renewables, on scant evidence to justify such differential 
treatment.259 Most glaringly, ISO-NE has had an ongoing controversy about how 
best to ensure adequate electricity supplies during the winter, when the region 
often risks a shortage of natural gas.260 ISO-NE recently proposed a short-term 
solution under which ratepayers would subsidize uneconomic fossil fuel plants 
by about $150 million per year to provide “winter energy security.”261 After the 
Commission initially expressed skepticism about ISO-NE’s proposal,262 FERC’s 
procedural rules allowed the proposal to go into effect in August 2019 due to 
lack of a quorum to vote the proposal up or down.263 Many worry that this 
incident is a harbinger of more actions to come from RTO incumbents using the 
amorphous concept of “fuel security” to prop up increasingly uneconomic fossil 
fuel resources.264 
The key takeaway of this analysis is that the policy priorities required to 
address climate change place particular strain on RTO governance. That said, 
readers may have noticed that the discussion above focused on certain RTOs 
more than others. Not all RTOs are equally resistant to renewables or demand-
side resources. MISO, for example, has been a leader in integrating wind into its 
system, along with the Southwestern Power Pool.265 Similarly, California has led 
the way on promoting more fulsome integration of DER and storage.266 It is 
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important to emphasize these regional differences when diagnosing what 
precisely has gone wrong in RTO governance, and what continues to go right. I 
consider what can be learned from divergent RTO practices in Part V. First, 
though, I return to governance theory to illuminate the institutional forces behind 
the troubling RTO behaviors described in this Section. 
IV. 
PRIVATIZATION AS THE PROBLEM: DIAGNOSING RTOS’ FLAWS 
It is time to connect the dots. Parts I and II introduced RTOs, 
contextualizing them as variations on the theme of privatization that has swept 
through U.S. governance. Part III illustrated why RTOs are problematic in 
practice, showing how they have resisted the policy priorities of state and federal 
regulators. This Section links RTOs’ origin story and their performance to 
diagnose what has gone wrong in RTO governance, highlighting how the failures 
detailed in Part III are the result of flawed institutional design. In brief, I contend 
that FERC was shortsighted in structuring regional grid governors as private 
membership entities answerable to regulators only under the traditional legal 
levers of utility rate regulation. 
Many scholars writing during the boom days of privatization approached 
the movement equivocally. To evaluate its wisdom in any given context, they 
suggested, required weighing the efficiency and effectiveness gains that more 
entrepreneurial governance might provide against the likely losses in direct 
governmental or political accountability.267 Two decades in, the experience of 
RTOs eludes even this generous framing.268 RTOs’ membership-club format has 
not led to entrepreneurial efficiency—to the contrary, incumbents use these 
institutions to block cost-reducing reforms. At the same time, this governance 
structure has created a growing rift between the objectives of market operators 
and the democratically determined objectives of state and federal regulators—in 
just the ways that many critics of outsourcing had predicted.269 
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This Section discusses why FERC should abandon hope in RTOs’ 
membership-club democracy as a sound method of grid management. After 
building the case that a reform effort focused on RTOs’ internal governance 
flaws is inadequate, the Section goes on to diagnose two larger accountability 
gaps that, it argues, form the real core of RTO governance problems: an inversion 
of the proper hierarchy between RTOs’ responsibilities and states’ legitimate 
policy priorities, and an oversight deficit between RTOs and their primary 
government regulator, FERC. 
A. The Limits of Self-Regulation 
Much of the recent research on RTOs has focused on their internal 
governance processes. In aggregate, this research suggests that these processes 
(outside California) excel at producing reforms that serve incumbents’ business 
interests but struggle to effectuate reforms that enhance competition or shrink 
the demand for electricity. This subpart summarizes this research, before arguing 
that a holistic view of RTO governance flaws suggests the need for more robust 
fixes than are typically suggested. 
One clear pattern in RTO governance is a tendency to favor building 
traditional infrastructure. Recall that most RTO governance processes utilize 
weighted sectoral voting, with demand and supply sides of the market ostensibly 
checking each other.270 However, this theory of self-checking has never really 
had a grounding in reality. As FERC observed in 2002 with respect to PJM, 
“[f]our of [the region’s five membership] classes represent interests that would 
benefit from higher levels of demand.”271 That is to say, generation and 
transmission-owning entities generally all want to build more infrastructure, and 
those selling electricity generally prefer to sell more of it.272 Of the voting sectors 
in PJM, only end-use customers have a strong incentive to favor demand-
reducing technologies.273 The other natural watchdog against overbuilding 
tendencies is consumer advocates. However, in most regions, consumer 
advocates have no voting power, and at most they hold 8 percent (in MISO).274 
Accordingly, it proves relatively easy to muster supermajority support for 
incumbent-supply-enhancing proposals within RTO governance processes.275 
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In contrast, when proposals are advanced to increase competition and 
promote new technologies, it proves difficult to overcome supermajority voting 
thresholds. For example, in their 2018 modeling of PJM voting patterns on 
capacity market reforms, Kyungjin Yoo and Seth Blumsack found that of six 
proposals advanced in PJM to reform the oversupplied capacity market, not one 
could obtain the supermajority support necessary to advance out of the Members 
Committee—despite the fact that the “status quo” option received the least 
support of all.276 Other reforms beneficial to consumers often wither and die in 
committee, as evidenced by RTOs’ patterned responses to demand-side 
technologies and clean energy. 277 
Independent RTO boards could provide a check on the incumbent bias of 
stakeholder processes. Recall that RTO boards are generally not bound by the 
outcome of stakeholder voting processes.278 However, RTO boards have been 
critiqued as overly focused on two interests. The first is reliability, which these 
boards prioritize in their “institutional self-interest,” given the extreme negative 
reactions that transmission-scale blackouts provoke.279 The second is the 
interests of transmission-holding companies, whose withdrawal would shrink the 
geographical footprint of the RTO.280 In combination, these institutional interests 
appear to prevent robust policing of incumbent favoritism and render these 
boards imperfect stewards of the public interest. 
As illustrative examples of opaque board interests, consider the processes 
producing the anti-renewable capacity market reforms in PJM and ISO New 
England. Each region failed to secure supermajority support for these reforms—
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and each board proceeded nevertheless, in the face of state opposition.281 In fact, 
PJM’s Board could not even come to an internal consensus. The region instead 
offered “two alternate (mutually exclusive) proposals,” each of which failed the 
stakeholder process, for the Commission to choose between.282 It is difficult to 
know each board’s internal motivations for filing changes that did not pass 
internal governance proceedings. But the pattern displayed—championing 
reforms that benefit large incumbent interests, at the expense of clean energy 
developers and over state protests—lends some force to worries that RTO boards 
may prioritize capacity over-procurement and self-preservation.283 
The most frequently proposed solution to these governance flaws is internal 
governance reform.284 However, I believe the transformation demanded by 
climate change cuts too deeply against theories of industry self-regulation to 
make internal reforms an effective stand-alone solution. Industry self-regulation 
works when the incumbent firms in an industry expect to be the firms of 
tomorrow, and expect their long-lived infrastructure investments to pay 
dividends.285 In that case, all firms have reciprocal incentives to engage in fair 
dealing.286 But for climate change policies to succeed, certain companies—most 
notably, those that have invested in coal and natural gas infrastructure—must 
lose money and market share.287 To avoid this outcome, they will use their voting 
power to bias market rules in favor of their assets. 
Even if voting sectors within RTOs were weighted differently, such that 
clean energy companies had more say in governance, the level of industry 
consolidation that has followed in the wake of PUHCA’s repeal could still skew 
voting patterns in favor of traditional generation sources. One component of 
electricity sector deregulation—particularly in the eastern states—was the 
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splitting apart of previously vertically integrated utilities into oppositional 
entities: supply on the one hand, and demand on the other.288 But the incomplete 
restructuring of the industry, combined with the return of mega-holding 
companies, erodes these gains: now large holding companies have numerous 
assets on both the supply and demand side of the ledger, creating large combined 
voting sway in RTO governance.289 For RTO governance to prove effective 
under these conditions, demand-serving affiliates within a holding company 
would have to check their supply-side sister companies. Technically, affiliates 
are supposed to be walled off from one another in stakeholder processes, so that 
such opposition can occur.290 But in practice, it is nearly impossible to know how 
often affiliates align their votes with holding company priorities, because only 
vote totals—not who voted for what—are recorded in lower-level committee 
meetings, where affiliate abuse might happen.291 Moreover, there has also been 
substantial consolidation in the ownership of merchant (i.e., competitive, non-
utility) gas-fired plants in recent years: private equity firms have purchased a 
large number of such plants in the United States, along with making significant 
investments in shale oil plays.292 This consolidation, too, creates obvious 
incentives for these entities to ensure that market rules perpetuate these fossil 
resources. 
All to say, it is difficult to continue to trust in the RTO construct when 
legislators and regulators have abnegated what used to be a core element of 
public utility doctrine: ensuring that dominant corporations do not, through a 
combination of concentrated vertical and horizontal power, run their sector for 
their own gain at the expense of people and the planet. On this topic, one final 
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point about skewed RTO incentives bears mention: even if the effects of industry 
consolidation were not a concern, a well-structured private RTO would still 
likely have interests out of step with the pressing and growing public interest in 
addressing climate change. An industry organization fundamentally devoted to 
keeping the lights on at reasonable prices cannot be expected to magically 
prioritize solving a problem that throws its basic operations out of whack. That 
is—or should be—the job of external regulators. Remember, RTOs are not 
operating in a legal vacuum. The courts have made clear that these entities are 
subject to public utility regulation, the same as any investor-owned utility.293 
Thus, in my estimation, the bigger question that research into RTO governance 
leaves unanswered is this: what has gone wrong in these external oversight 
processes? Why aren’t states and FERC able to channel RTO decision-making 
in the ways that federal statutory law contemplates? The remainder of this 
Section constructs that analysis, considering why the mechanisms built to 
superimpose democratically determined prerogatives on the electricity industry 
are failing. 
B. RTOs Trample States’ Legitimate Priorities 
Recall that the Federal Power Act gives states control over electricity 
generation and retail sales.294 This jurisdictional split has been critical in 
upholding a range of state laws aimed at promoting renewable energy and, most 
recently, nuclear energy.295 Even as courts have moved toward recognizing the 
electricity space as one of “collaborative federalism,” rather than a bright-line 
split in jurisdiction,296 they have remained clear that states retain their 
prerogative to determine the energy mix within their borders—so long as they 
do not explicitly regulate FERC’s wholesale markets.297 
As RTOs have established rules regarding transmission planning and 
energy and capacity market participation, they have increasingly touched upon 
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matters of state concern.298 In theory, that should not be a problem: RTOs’ 
persistent claims that they are neutral policy-takers means they should take state 
policy priorities as market constraints.299 But as described in Part III, that’s not 
what these organizations are doing. Certain RTOs’ aggressive use of market 
rules to wall state-supported renewable energy out of markets, and to resist the 
incorporation of other new technologies, puts the lie to arguments that RTOs 
passively accept state clean energy policies. To the contrary, RTOs have 
established market rules that undermine states’ goals in favor of increasing the 
profits of incumbent member utilities.300 
States are largely powerless within RTO governance processes to do 
anything about the fact that RTOs are undermining their lawful state policies (at 
least outside California). Even though FERC realized at the inception of RTOs 
that their governance would directly impact state policies, it hesitated to give 
states any formalized role in RTO governance.301 Consequently, states have been 
left with merely an advisory role in RTO policy-making in most regions—and 
this role does not carry nearly enough weight when it gets in the way of member-
utilities’ profits. To take one example, PJM acknowledged that proponents of 
anti-renewable reforms in its markets intended to “[disincentivize] states from 
providing subsidies in the first instance.”302 Such initiatives amount to a brazen 
usurpation of lawful state prerogatives for the gain of private fossil fuel interests. 
States that object to the policy impacts (and hefty price tags) of RTO market 
rules do have a “nuclear option”: they can require their jurisdictional utilities to 
withdraw from the RTO. Indeed, several states have initiated efforts along these 
lines. New Jersey’s Board of Public Utilities has begun a proceeding to consider 
whether to withdraw its utilities from the PJM capacity market and have the state 
guarantee resource adequacy instead,303 and Maryland has indicated its interest 
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in a similar move.304 Connecticut has threatened to go further by withdrawing 
from ISO-NE altogether.305 
However, although legally permissible, pulling utilities out of an RTO is a 
fraught and time-consuming process. FERC approval must be secured, and a 
withdrawing state or utility would have to figure out how to replace a host of 
complex technical and engineering oversight functions previously performed by 
the RTO.306 Whether the eastern RTOs’ aggressive recent actions finally prompt 
any states to follow through on withdrawal remains to be seen.307 Even so, these 
withdrawals would scarcely be a clean energy victory, given the benefits that 
broad regionalization offers clean energy.308 Thus the ability to exit gives states 
devoted to a clean energy transition at best incomplete leverage within their 
RTOs. 
It is worth acknowledging that not every state objects to RTOs’ frequent 
incumbency biases. Indeed, some states themselves continue to adopt special 
supports for fossil fuels,309 which is their lawful prerogative under the Federal 
Power Act. More generally, states have frequently voiced concerns that RTO 
rule changes to incorporate demand-side technologies may usurp state 
jurisdiction.310 But jurisdictional concerns aside, states have largely supported 
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1000 Implementation, CQ ROLL CALL (July 25, 2013). 
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FERC-led efforts to reduce costs in RTOs by including more resources.311 And 
many of those states most active on climate have pleaded for more support from 
their RTO—or at least not active hostility—to help accomplish their clean energy 
goals.312 Similarly, several regional state organizations have written letters to 
their RTOs asking for rule revisions to better respect state clean energy goals and 
help incorporate cost-saving, climate-friendly technologies.313 
That RTOs have acted so slowly—and sometimes intransigently—in the 
face of these state pleas suggests a mismatch in the current duties of RTOs and 
the role of state regulators in these organizations.314 Several scholars have 
commended RTOs as regional-level institutions in which states can play an 
important role—and I agree, as a matter of theory.315 But in practice, the current 
relative powerlessness of states within RTOs inverts the hierarchy that the 
Federal Power Act creates between policy-makers and market operators. Part V 
considers how a reexamination of the state role in RTOs might be one way of 
improving their functionality. 
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C. RTOs and FERC: Diminishment and Aggrandizement 
One retort to my critiques of the weak role of state regulators in RTOs is 
that FERC is there to mind the store—and to act as an adjudicator of federalist 
tensions within energy policy.316 Perhaps the problem, then, is with the agency. 
Certainly this is true in part. But as I explain below, the privatized RTO structure 
both diminishes and aggrandizes the role of FERC in problematic ways, with 
respect to different policy priorities. In short, the structure of FERC’s legal 
oversight of RTOs makes it easy for FERC to justify approving reforms favored 
by incumbents, but difficult for the agency to force the industry to innovate. 
1. Diminished FERC Authority in the Face of Competing Priorities 
Take the first category of RTO challenges catalogued above: resistance to 
FERC’s efforts to incorporate demand response, storage, and DER into their 
markets.317 Here, FERC’s priorities—ensuring lower-cost electricity by 
including more demand-side resources—have been at odds with those of 
incumbent generation and transmission owners.318 Moreover, RTOs’ focus on 
reliability above other priorities gives these organizations limited incentives to 
take risks on new resources. It has thus taken numerous orders and much cajoling 
for FERC to get RTOs to adopt necessary reforms—with many changes still 
needed.319 
One might view this situation as tolerable—after all, FERC has ordered 
RTOs into action on these resources. But scholars and students of administrative 
law should quickly see that this is an odd way for agency policy-making to 
proceed.320 To force RTOs to address FERC’s priorities, the agency must first 
issue a finding under Federal Power Act section 206 that current RTO tariffs are 
“unjust and unreasonable.”321 Then, RTOs work through their internal 
governance processes to propose solutions. If FERC rejects a proposal, the whole 
process starts over—often, over the course of more than a year, while the 
problem that provoked FERC’s section 206 finding festers on. FERC has thus 
created a regulatory structure that is a far cry from the typical Chevron deference 
to agency action, in which the agency selects the best path forward under flexible 
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statutory authority.322 The statutory requirement that FERC accept any RTO 
practice that it cannot prove patently unreasonable—coupled with FERC’s 
tendency to solve problems through regional compliance filings—diminishes the 
agency’s ability to accomplish desirable reforms on any reasonable timeline. To 
make RTOs better servants of the public interest, a new model of agency 
oversight is necessary. 
2. Aggrandized FERC Authority When Interests Align 
Better oversight would not, however, have stopped RTOs’ recent efforts to 
block renewables’ participation or to prioritize fuel security as a marker of grid 
resiliency.323 Here, FERC has been firmly on board. Indeed, in the case of PJM, 
the Commission ordered the RTO to be even more punitive with respect to “state-
supported resource[s]” than the region had proposed.324 A similar dynamic 
adhered in the recent case of New York ISO’s (NYISO’s) proposed revisions to 
its capacity market. After reaching agreement among its stakeholders and market 
monitor, NYISO filed a request to amend its tariff to better align capacity market 
rules with state public policy preferences for renewable energy.325 In September 
2020, the Commission denied this request on the grounds that NYISO did not 
“provide sufficient justification” for prioritizing resources favored by state 
policy.326 This decision again provoked a strong dissent from Commissioner 
Glick, who accused the Commission of erecting “a mind-boggling series of 
unnecessary and unreasoned obstacles aimed at stalling New York’s efforts to 
transition the state toward its clean energy future.”327 
As these developments illustrate, the Trump Administration has staffed a 
Commission that has frequently favored coal and natural gas over renewable 
resources—causing many to worry that FERC, once a bulwark independent 
commission, may be dominated by administration loyalists in ways that undercut 
its mission to ensure just, reasonable, and non-discriminatory rates.328 So what 
does private governance have to do with this challenge? 
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The counterintuitive insights provided by Jon Michaels in his 2017 
examination of the perils of privatization, Constitutional Coup, prove prescient 
on this question. Michaels asserts that the reason to worry about privatization is 
not that it diminishes agency power, but that it concentrates it, forming a 
problematic pipeline between agency heads and private contractors.329 When 
these parties act in tandem, Michaels worries, it subverts the “administrative 
separation of powers” that typically triangulates power between agency heads, 
agency staff, and civil society.330 
Recent anti-renewables activity in RTOs is a case study in this kind of 
aggrandizement of power. In the case of policies that prop up fossil fuel plants, 
incumbent suppliers prove eager participants in proposing and pushing forward 
these market reforms—even over the protest of many on the demand side of 
energy markets.331 When these profit-driven priorities align with the political 
priorities of agency heads, it is a recipe for aggressive agency action of dubious 
democratic pedigree.332 FERC’s obligation to passively and reactively accept 
any “just and reasonable” proposal filed by RTOs provides an agency 
sympathetic to incumbents’ agenda with substantial cover in promoting 
whatever private interests come to dominate the RTO.333 Thus, whereas FERC’s 
action-forcing mechanisms are limited when it disagrees with RTOs’ policy 
prerogatives, the deferential review required of RTOs’ protectionist proposals 
aggrandizes the agency’s power in cases of private sector-regulator alignment. 
One marker of the recent power grab on the part of incumbents aligned with 
Trump administration officials can be seen in the recent profusion of dissenting 
opinions from FERC commissioners—once a relative rarity.334 These dissents 
track the increasing alarm among certain commissioners that the Trump 
Administration’s FERC had abandoned the agency’s long-purported goal of 
creating “fuel-neutral” energy markets335—and instead aligned itself with certain 
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incumbents’ interests.336 The private-club-to-sympathetic-commissioner 
pipeline facilitates the rapid translation of this policy alignment into 
consequential reforms. 
The joint challenges detailed in this part—internal governance flaws, state 
powerlessness, and FERC diminishment/aggrandizement—all point to the 
conclusion that decarbonizing the electricity sector will require more than just 
developing and promoting smart substantive policies. Before these can be 
adopted, the sector’s club-like governance structure must be reconsidered. 
V. 
WAYS FORWARD: A REFORM AGENDA 
Here is where we have come: although the challenge of climate change is 
pushing state and federal legislators and regulators to adopt policies and 
priorities that privilege clean energy, the U.S. electricity grid is governed 
predominantly by behemoth, incumbent industry members with little interest in 
facilitating these changes. To build the clean energy economy needed for the 
twenty-first century—the century of climate change—RTO governance reforms 
are imperative. 
The 2021 presidential transition presents an opening for FERC to pivot in 
new directions. Consequently, reformers are now focusing on how a Biden 
FERC could pursue policies that facilitate progress on climate change. But this 
Article highlights the challenges of leaping to substantive reforms without a 
critical examination of their institutional context. As I hope the analysis here 
makes clear, the new administration—as well as state and public interest 
advocates—should pay equal attention to grid governance reform as a 
precondition for durable climate progress. 
The goal for reformers should not be to abandon the regional format and 
unwind back to a time when states had predominant control. Both technology 
and policy prerogatives have usurped this possibility. Not only does today’s 
interconnected grid make regional management economically and technically 
desirable, but the growing policy mandate to transition to clean energy demands 
even greater regional cooperation on climate.337 Indeed, many states in regions 
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that previously declined to join an RTO have renewed their interest in 
regionalizing grid governance—but have reservations regarding the risks of 
prevailing RTO governance structures.338 
The answer, then, is not to scrap RTOs but to transform them into regional 
entities capable of accomplishing evolving public objectives.339 And so, the 
critical questions become: What is the ideal institutional structure for regional 
grid governance? How should federal and state regulators share this densely 
technical, rapidly evolving space with the infrastructure companies that keep our 
lights on? There are, I argue, four pathways—some mutually reinforcing—to 
better grid governance: (1) pare back RTO authority; (2) increase regulatory 
oversight; (3) better police sectoral corporate power; and (4) consider a public 
option. 
A. Pare Them Back 
As mentioned earlier, FERC did not expect RTOs to come to have the range 
of functions and functional policy-making authority that they do today. Instead, 
it saw a role for these organizations in doing what utilities had long done, but on 
a more efficient, integrated regional scale: managing the flow of electrons over 
the transmission grid.340 Some RTOs have strayed further from this basic mission 
than others. In particular, by turning resource adequacy over to markets, PJM 
and ISO New England have cemented their reliance on convoluted stakeholder 
processes to oversee a broad range of decisions about who gets to participate in 
energy and capacity markets, and on what terms.341 
In contrast, MISO has engendered less controversy than its eastern 
neighbors by eschewing a mandatory capacity market and retaining more state 
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authority in resource adequacy determinations.342 Similarly, one might point to 
Southwest Power Pool (SPP) as an RTO that has amassed relatively little power 
beyond managing the grid and running basic energy markets.343 In the process, 
SPP has managed to integrate impressive quantities of renewable energy and to 
avoid enervating its state partners (at least, for the most part).344 To be sure, states 
and RTOs in these regions have some issues remaining to work out, not least 
around coal, but states at least have authority to act on these challenges.345 
This comparative assessment points to one plausible reform: return RTOs 
to a more basic set of functions. Most notably, there is rising support for the idea 
of eliminating mandatory capacity markets from eastern RTOs.346 FERC should 
be able to take this step unilaterally by declaring that the current mandatory 
capacity market constructs are “unjust and unreasonable” under Federal Power 
Act section 206 and ordering regions to find another solution to resource 
adequacy that better accommodates states.347 One model worth considering is 
that of California, where the California Public Utilities Commission and CAISO 
share responsibility over resource adequacy in a way that tracks their 
comparative advantages: CAISO is in charge of the technical elements of 
forecasting resource adequacy requirements, while the state commission 
oversees planning for how to meet these requirements.348 
Restructuring control over resource adequacy would go a long way toward 
remedying the mischief that pro-fossil companies have caused in ISO-New 
England and PJM.349 Nevertheless, this move alone will not solve all governance 
challenges. Already, there are controversies over how RTOs determine “price 
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formation” in energy markets and ancillary service markets as well. Many of 
these concerns are legitimate: as renewable energy drives the marginal-bid-based 
clearing price in energy markets downward, there are important questions to be 
answered regarding how to ensure adequate compensation to incent new 
development.350 But again, the challenge comes down to who writes these rules 
within the RTO context. To ensure that pricing in these basic markets remains 
just and reasonable under changing conditions, FERC may need to take a heavier 
hand in dictating what fair treatment looks like.351 In other words, the jig is up 
on light-touch, experimental regulation of core RTO functions. These 
organizations have proven themselves institutionally ill-suited to the type of self-
management idealized by new governance reformers. 
All to say, if FERC were willing to assert its muscle, there are several steps 
the agency could take to pare back the authority of RTOs to make them more 
closely resemble the blueprint laid out two decades ago and embodied by some 
of the less controversial modern RTO experiments. The decision to embrace such 
reforms depends, of course, on the political and policy priorities of the agency at 
a given time. And even if FERC were inclined to pursue reforms along these 
lines, there would likely be industry backlash, which might manifest itself 
through “hydraulics” that put pressure on other points of RTO decision-making 
(notably, energy market rules).352 But at least FERC would have a narrower set 
of potential market rule distortions to police and could therefore do so with more 
vigilance. 
B. Increase Public Oversight and Control 
A second set of reforms involves accepting RTOs’ aggrandized modern 
responsibilities and enhancing public oversight and control of these 
organizations commensurately. As Anne Joseph O’Connell has observed in her 
work on boundary organizations, these kinds of “centripetal” reforms—where 
power moves away from private entities, back toward government—are not 
common.353 Nevertheless, O’Connell suggests that these shifts are most likely 
where “the benefits of more political control . . . increase compared to the 
costs.”354 As this Article has traced, climate change places grid governance in 
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just such a position, as the risks of relying on private membership clubs to pursue 
decarbonization initiatives that cut against their interests have become apparent. 
Enhanced public control might emanate from both the states and FERC. 
This Section describes options for each in turn. Moreover, it is worth noting that 
this increased oversight could function alongside the reforms suggested in the 
previous part, which focus on paring back RTOs’ responsibilities. 
Here too, there are modern models. As described in Part II.C, California’s 
ISO stands apart for having selected a unique governance structure in which the 
ISO functions more like a state agency than a private club. This agency-like 
structure allows California to have confidence that the goals of its ISO align with 
the goals of the state. Such alignment has been particularly important as 
California has dramatically ramped up its climate ambitions. CAISO boasts 
openly about its commitment to a “Clean, Green Grid” and has adopted the 
integration of renewable energy and demand-side technologies as a core part of 
its mission.355 
Transferring this model of pure political control beyond a single-state RTO 
proves complicated, given that state interests within a region often do not align. 
California itself has struggled with this issue as the state considers whether to 
regionalize its RTO to enhance the integration of renewable energy.356 One 
primary concern has been that a regional RTO that relinquished the state-agency 
format would cede too much control to private players or sister states with 
incompatible goals.357 
But RTO reform need not go as far as the California model to create a more 
robust role for states. MISO, for example, has incorporated state regulatory 
authorities as the most powerful weighted voting bloc within its Membership 
Committee—thus building in a more direct state oversight role of its markets.358 
FERC might consider forcing other regions to reform their governance structures 
to provide a similarly strong role for state interests (probably again through a 
section 206 finding that RTOs’ current usurpation of state prerogatives creates 
unjust and unreasonable prices, and that membership rules are practices affecting 
these rates and therefore within FERC’s jurisdiction).359 
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A stronger reform would be to give regional state committees a veto-point 
over RTO decision-making at a level superior to regular membership. Along 
these lines, several states at the time of RTO formation proposed that the 
organizations should be governed by “Federal-State Joint Boards,” which would 
engage in collaborative decision-making on matters of shared jurisdiction.360 
This idea was never fleshed into a fully formed proposal, because FERC opted 
for the private RTO model. However, reinvigorated discussions along these lines 
might now prove fruitful. 
There are, of course, risks to giving states too much control over RTOs, 
especially given the polarization among states regarding their attitudes toward 
clean energy.361 In regions where many states oppose clean energy, a stronger 
state oversight presence might not prove an antidote to challenges of incumbent 
favoritism within the RTO. But this risk is baked into energy law: As the Federal 
Power Act makes clear, “[t]he states, not the Commission, are the entities 
responsible for shaping the generation mix.”362 To respect individual state 
prerogatives, any reforms in the direction of greater state control should include 
mechanisms to ensure that states cannot run rough-shod over each other’s 
preferences. With such protections in place, I favor giving states greater de facto 
control over energy generation, to mirror their putative legal control, in spite of 
the risks. If that control results in more fossil-fueled energy, then changing state 
policy preferences to better favor clean energy is a democratic battle that must 
be fought and won at the state level. As hard as that battle may be, it is preferable 
to continuing to cede control over the energy transition to the very companies 
who stand to lose the most from it. 
However, if FERC remains wary of so fully involving states in regional 
market oversight, it could pursue more piecemeal, but still impactful, changes: 
For example, recognizing the traditional state role over resource adequacy, 
FERC could give regional state committees the right to approve or reject by 
supermajority RTOs’ proposed changes in resource adequacy rules.363 Or 
 
 360. Comments of the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, at 11, Reg’l Transmission Orgs., 
FERC Docket No. RM99-02-000 (Aug. 20, 1999) (citing as potential precedents the “Susquehanna 
River Basin Commission, the Delaware River Basin Commission and the Joint Pipeline Office which 
regulates the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System”). See also Initial Comments of the Nine State Commissions 
Representing the East-Central/Midwest/Southwest (ECMS) Region at 7, Reg’l Transmission Orgs., 
FERC Docket No. RM99-2-000 (Aug. 23, 1999); Comments of the Illinois Commerce Commission at 
23–24, Reg’l Transmission Orgs., FERC Docket No. RM99-2-000 (Aug. 11, 1999); Smith, supra note 
119, at 191–93 (describing legal pathways allowing for this sort of arrangement). 
 361. See generally LEAH CARDAMORE STOKES, SHORT CIRCUITING POLICY: INTEREST GROUPS 
AND THE BATTLE OVER CLEAN ENERGY AND CLIMATE POLICY IN THE AMERICAN STATES (2020) 
(tracing the difficult politics of clean energy in four “red” states over the last fifteen years and showing 
how fossil-fuel allied interest groups dominate political and regulatory processes in Texas, Kansas, 
Arizona, and Ohio). 
 362. Order on Rehearing and Clarification, Calpine Corp. v. PJM Interconnection, 171 FERC ¶ 
61,035 (Comm’r Glick, dissenting, at P 5) (Apr. 16, 2020). 
 363. Given that SPP already allows its regional state committee control over resource adequacy, 
this proposal seems legally plausible. See Chen & Murnan, supra note 30, at 15–16 (making this point). 
270 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  109:209 
perhaps FERC could give regional state committees the right to file a competing 
proposal when they disagree with an RTO’s section 205 filing—the same right 
that is presently afforded to New England’s stakeholder governance group.364 
So much for state involvement. What about FERC’s own oversight 
strategies? As described in Part II.D, the circuit courts have diminished these as 
well through opinions that limit the matters FERC can regulate and the extent to 
which the agency can amend RTO proposals. FERC still has tools, however, 
blunted though they may be. The agency could become more muscular in its use 
of section 206 findings that regional tariffs are “unjust and unreasonable,” might 
more actively control regional responses to such filings, and might use section 
206 findings as the basis of a larger proceeding devoted to reconsidering the RTO 
format.365 
Ultimately, if RTOs are to retain their current powers, it is time to reckon 
with the fact that these institutions are categorically different from investor-
owned utilities and should not be treated identically under the law. Section 205—
the section that provides that any RTO or utility filing that is “just and 
reasonable” must be accepted—was meant for basic pricing schemes, not policy-
making proposals.366 The ideal solution here would be for Congress to create a 
special category of review for RTO tariff filings within the Federal Power Act, 
providing FERC with the ability to amend portions of RTO filings and to reject 
solutions that it finds plausible but inferior. These changes would recalibrate 
FERC’s authority over RTOs to align it with the authority of other federal 
agencies engaged in policy-making, which operate under the benefit of Chevron 
deference to preferred agency solutions.367 
C. Improve the Possibilities for Good Internal Governance 
In addition to shedding RTO functions and/or enhancing federal and state 
oversight, reformers might consider cabining the creeping dominance of the 
sector by a few key players. For the reasons described above, I have limited 
confidence that reforms focused on RTOs’ internal governance processes alone 
could adequately recalibrate sectoral responsibility. But reforms in this vein 
stand much better chance of success if FERC simultaneously peers behind the 
curtain of agglomerated corporate power in the utility industry. Otherwise, no 
matter how many tweaks FERC makes in voting sectors and their relative 
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weights, heavyweight corporations with holdings that cut across these sectors 
will continue to have the ability to manipulate votes toward their best interest. 
Moreover, to the extent there is a perception that RTO boards often bend to the 
most powerful interests in the industry when filing non-stakeholder-approved 
tariff amendments, only a decrease in holding company authority could remedy 
these feared backchannel dealings. 
If FERC wanted to increase scrutiny of corporate mergers and their impact 
on electricity governance, it could do so by drawing upon pre-existing regulatory 
authority. FERC’s statutory charge is to ensure that proposed mergers are 
“consistent with the public interest.”368 The agency’s current practice is governed 
by a Merger Policy Statement, which FERC itself could amend.369 As utility 
expert Scott Hempling has suggested, perhaps “public interest” review should 
include not only a market power screen, but a more searching inquiry into 
whether each additional merger might harm the overall structural competition of 
the electricity sector.370 Alternatively, FERC might place conditions on mergers 
that limit RTO stakeholder participation when the merger could create 
opportunities for self-interested voting.371 
For a more robust fix, Congress might revisit its 2005 decision to repeal 
PUHCA, which repudiated the last vestiges of protection against mega-utilities. 
Utilities, of course, suggest that the post-PUHCA diversification of their 
holdings has brought significant gains—while others question this account.372 
More work needs to be done to understand the full implications of utility merger 
activity unleashed in 2005.373 
Alternatively, if Congress and the executive branch prove unwilling, the 
courts may present an increasingly plausible avenue for reigning in utility power. 
To date, electricity corporations have largely been immunized from antitrust 
challenges due to FERC oversight and regulation.374 The theory animating this 
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immunization is that FERC’s review of utilities’ filed rates obviates the need for 
judicial antitrust scrutiny.375 However, in light of the significant changes in the 
industry, scholars have questioned whether courts should continue to allow the 
filed rate doctrine to stand as a bar to claims of industry collusion,376 and the 
Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the applicability of state antitrust laws to 
FERC-regulated natural gas pipelines.377 Similarly, the D.C. Circuit recently 
found that another public-private boundary entity—Amtrak—violated the Due 
Process Clause through its dual roles as competitor and regulator of train 
operations.378 In that opinion, the court signaled a growing skepticism of such 
arrangements, observing that “government’s increasing reliance on public-
private partnerships portends an even more ill-fitting accommodation between 
the exercise of regulatory power and concerns about fairness and 
accountability.”379 Although there is no rock-solid case under current precedent 
to assert that RTOs’ self-interested rulemakings create either an antitrust or due 
process challenge, continued display of an incumbency bias could push courts 
towards accepting a theory crafted along these lines. 
D. Explore a Public Option 
There is, finally, a more radical option that reformers might consider: 
Taking a cue from several European countries and the California model, 
management of the grid could be made more thoroughly public. This option 
would go much further than the suggestions for enhanced control offered in 
subpart (b), and would face substantial—perhaps politically insurmountable—
opposition from the utility industry. Nevertheless, in a moment where the 
national conversation about climate change policy has tacked in a more 
progressive direction, it is worth considering. Indeed, if infrastructure 
development on the scale envisioned by the proponents of a Green New Deal is 
to succeed, a publicly owned or operated grid might form a critical institutional 
piece of the puzzle.380 Moreover, to integrate ever-increasing levels of variable 
renewable energy, experts are converging on the conclusion that the U.S. grid 
would be best run as a single, national, coordinated machine.381 Exploration of 
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new ways of structuring such an organization that avoid the pathologies of the 
current RTO format should help advance this pressing conversation. 
Considerably more work is needed to develop the contours of a public grid 
governance model—work that is beyond the scope of this Article. But in its 
broad outlines, it might resemble what the group Public Citizen asked FERC to 
consider back in the 1990s. Recognizing the inherent conflict between consumer 
interests and private transmission owners,382 Public Citizen urged FERC to 
create “three publicly-owned non-profit transmission companies (public 
transcos) [that would] own and operate the transmission systems . . . .”383 These 
public transcos would have “no affiliates and no subsidiaries,” and would be run 
by a “publicly-accountable board of directors . . . .”384 As we know, FERC 
declined to pursue the public transco model. Several European countries, 
however, have gone this route, with ownership of the grid vested in a single state-
owned enterprise.385 California provides an alternative model of political control 
without ownership, and has proven that more direct political control can align 
regulatory priorities and grid governance.386 
How FERC might effectuate a transition to public ownership or control is 
a complex question. Perhaps a bold FERC, looking at the necessary pace and 
scale of decarbonization, might justify ordering significant RTO governance 
reform or transmission divestment to a public entity as a necessary precondition 
for “just and reasonable” rates in the era of climate change.387 It is, however, 
unclear whether the federal courts would be willing to sanction such profound 
industry restructuring under longstanding statutory authority.388 It might take a 
full-throated congressional effort to abandon the private grid. 
I mention the public option not as a likely short-term solution, but to round 
out the picture of possible governance structures as policy-makers think about 
the future of the grid—and to refuse to be constrained to the narrowed imaginary 
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that the privatization movement has left us. Even the threat of a public takeover 
might prod RTOs to relent to the less thoroughgoing, but still impactful, reforms 
suggested above. In any event, the next step down the road to public transcos 
should almost certainly be more rigorous comparative study of how public 
models have performed in other countries, and the possibilities and limitations 
they might face in the United States. 
CONCLUSION 
Commentators have long opined that democracy presents a key impediment 
to progress on climate change, because each of us is psychologically and 
structurally hard-wired to vote against the long-term interests of humanity.389 
States and localities have begun to overcome this putative hurdle to climate 
progress: One-third of Americans now live in a city or state with a 100 percent 
clean energy mandate or goal.390 Now that federal leaders too are prioritizing 
climate action, many hope for swift results via executive branch authority. 
However, political progress has unleashed a new effort by fossil fuel incumbents 
to structure the energy system in their favor. 
To remedy this mismatch between democratic priorities and grid 
governance, this Article has argued that the functionally privatized model that 
FERC selected to run competitive electricity markets two decades ago must be 
reformed to match modern public aims. Reforms in this sector must be 
calculated, swift, and decisive if the United States is to achieve anything close to 
the clean energy transition demanded by atmospheric physics. 
At the same time, the Article has contextualized RTOs as sectoral 
symptoms of troubling trends toward privatization and agglomeration that 
pervade the modern U.S. economy and the institutions ostensibly designed to 
shape and control it.391 In this context, RTOs highlight the importance of 
institutional structure when seeking to deploy a legal framework as broad and 
powerful as public utility. An expansion of public utility law to new sectors could 
help to curb the extreme corporate domination of this second Gilded Age. But 
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before embracing this strategy, the modern potential of public utility must first 
be reclaimed within the electricity sector, which will either embrace the 
existential challenge of climate change or take us all down with it. 
 
